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When policymakers and academics think about designing optimal innovation
incentives, they almost exclusively limit their considerations to various types of re-
ward incentives-that is, innovation "carrots." But in this Article, we show that,
under specific circumstances, innovation "sticks'-potential penalties for failures
to innovate-can play valuable roles in our innovation policy, either alone or in
conjunction with innovation carrots. We also provide examples of several innova-
tion sticks that have already been used with apparent success, including the feder-
al Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards. Finally, we apply our approach to
a new area-the problem of car fatalities-to illustrate the potential of innovation
sticks to yield substantial social benefits. Our model suggests that a relatively sim-
ple system of yardstick penalties could help reduce national auto fatalities by as
much as 20 percent simply by bringing laggard entities (such as companies and
states) up to the median.
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INTRODUCTION
It has long been said that necessity is the mother of inven-
tion.' You would not know it from reading today's innovation lit-
erature, though. That literature focuses almost exclusively on
"carrots," or opportunities for rewards. The most important such
rewards discussed in the legal literature are intellectual proper-
ty rights (IPRs), which give creators the privilege of excluding
others from the marketplace.2 Financial inducement prizes and
government grants have also been widely discussed, particularly
in the economics literature3 Recent attention has also been giv-
en to additional mechanisms such as R & D tax credits4 and
"commons-based" approaches.5
1 The phrase goes back, in fact, to Plato. See Plato, The Republic, in 3 The Dia-
logues of Plato 1, 49 (Oxford 3d ed 1931) (B. Jowett, trans).
2 See, for example, Robert P. Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property 27 (Harvard
2011); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual
Property Law 111 (Harvard 2003).
3 See Suzanne Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives 31-58 (MIT 2006); Brian D.
Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts,
73 Am Econ Rev 691, 703-04 (1983).
4 See, for example, Daniel J. Hemel and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the
Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 Tex L Rev 303, 321-26 (2013) (focusing on R & D tax incen-
tives); Shaun P. Mahaffy, Note, The Case for Tax: A Comparative Approach to Innovation
Policy, 123 Yale L J 812, 843-44 (2013) (discussing the use of the tax system to bolster
research incentives).
5 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms
Markets and Freedom 320-55 (Yale 2006).
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This vast literature, however, presents a puzzle: it does not
address what role, if any, "sticks" might play in innovation policy.6
This Article introduces the concept of the innovation sticks as a
policy tool and describes their advantages and limits. Instead of
rewarding an actor for innovating, innovation sticks threaten to
penalize an actor for failing to innovate. Drawing on the insights
of the new carrots-and-sticks literature, we describe why inno-
vation sticks have been invisible in the intellectual property (IP)
field and theorize the circumstances in which sticks may be a
good policy choice, either alone or-likely more often-in con-
junction with traditional or nontraditional carrots.
Because they provide penalties rather than rewards, inno-
vation sticks cannot perform one function that is often assumed
essential in the IP and information-economics literature: they
cannot compensate parties for their investments in information
production.7 This literature thus suggests that innovation sticks
should not exist. Yet they do.
The federal government's Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standards, for example, create penalties for car compa-
nies whose fleets fail to meet fuel-efficiency standards that in-
crease over time.8 The CAFE program is a stick because it mobi-
lizes penalties rather than rewards, and in our parlance it is an
"innovation" stick because it plausibly induces innovation or the
6 The only work we are aware of that identifies the potential of innovation sticks is
a recent unpublished working paper. See generally Julien Pbnin, Should We Oblige
Firms to Invest in R&D? Knowledge Spillovers and the Market of "Not to Invest in R&D
Tradable Permits" (unpublished manuscript, Nov 14, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/NZ9H-J9V8. In that paper, Professor Julien P~nin makes the case for
one particular kind of stick-a system of tradable permits not to engage in R & D-
rather than a case for sticks in general. We come to some similar conclusions, particular-
ly regarding the possible promise of sticks, but we develop a set of arguments-for ex-
ample, about the innovation literature, the undercompensation problem, and the possi-
ble trade-offs between nontraditional carrots and sticks-that he does not. Professor Jay
P. Kesan talks about adopting carrot-and-stick incentives within the patent system to
produce better prior art disclosures, but he does not consider penalizing failures to inno-
vate. See generally Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17
Berkeley Tech L J 763 (2002).
7 As Professors Gerrit De Geest and Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci put it, "Stick regimes
naturally undercompensate and therefore also tend to violate the participation con-
straints of agents. Carrots, on the other hand, are either fully compensatory or overcom-
pensatory." Gerrit De Geest and Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Carrots versus Sticks *18
(Washington University in St. Louis School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Aug 2009), archived at http://perma.cc4LGX-SGKH. For a description of why the com-
pensation of innovators is typically assumed necessary, see Part I.B.
8 For a fuller description of the CAFE standards, see Part II.A.
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production of new information.9 Although there is disagreement
about the efficacy of the CAFE program, a National Research
Council review in 2002, for example, concluded that "[t]he CAFE
program has clearly contributed to increased fuel economy of the
nation's light-duty vehicle fleet during the past 22 years."'10
CAFE standards are set by regulators who have long seen them
as "technology forcing."" Recent amendments have pushed fur-
ther to include standards that are "augural, meaning that they
represent [the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion's] current best estimate, based on the information available
to the agency today, of what levels of stringency might be maxi-
mum feasible in those model years."12 The existing IP literature,
however, gives us few tools for understanding why the program
might exist, why it might be effective, or whether it is an exam-
ple of a broader possible set of innovation tools.
Before proceeding, it is important to address whether there
is a meaningful difference between carrots and sticks. As Profes-
sor Wendy Gordon has observed: "One can verbally transform
most benefit questions into 'harms' and vice versa by juggling
the baseline from which effects are measured."'13 If automobile
manufacturers expected, as one of the costs of doing business, to
pay the government $50 million per year for the environmental
damage done by their cars, then any possibility of reducing the
payment-say, to merely $40 million-might be experienced as
a carrot. We readily acknowledge that whether something is
seen as a carrot or a stick depends on the baseline framing,
which can, in some instances, be malleable. Then again, it is the
rare mousetrap manufacturer who views the failure of the gov-
ernment to grant a twenty-year monopoly on a new product as a
punishment for not coming up with a better trap. And it is the
rare automobile manufacturer who views a CAFE fine as the ab-
sence of a reward. As we emphasize below,14 potential inventors
9 We return to the question of what we mean by "innovation" in Part I.B.
10 National Research Council, Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) Standards 3 (National Academy 2002) ("CAFE Report").
11 Center for Auto Safety v National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 793
F2d 1322, 1339 (DC Cir 1986).
12 Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Transportation, 2017 and
Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed Reg 62624, 62627 (2012).
13 Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual
Property, 21 J Legal Stud 449, 451 (1992).
14 See Part I.A.
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volunteer for carrots-for example, when they apply for a pa-
tent. Potential inventors who ultimately fail are unlikely to self-
nominate to bear the pain of the stick.15
In Part I, we set forth our theoretical account of the poten-
tial and limits of innovation sticks. We begin by briefly review-
ing the justifications offered for IP, as well as the main trade-
offs identified in the IP and innovation-economics literature
among different kinds of carrots, and in particular between
what we will call "traditional carrots" (namely, exclusion rights),
and "nontraditional carrots" (most prominently, government
grants and prizes). Certain benefits and drawbacks of each of
these mechanisms have long been identified in the literature.
For example, a key trade-off between prizes and patents is in
the comparative costs (including of error) of government estima-
tions of the values of the desired innovations versus the compar-
ative costs of the deadweight losses associated with exclusive
rights.16
We also recount several more-recent arguments for the im-
portance of nontraditional carrots, stressing these because they
also expand the potential utility of sticks. In particular, nontra-
ditional carrots-and nontraditional sticks (together, "nontradi-
tional measures")-are particularly useful when predictable
market failures exist.17 For example, markets radically under-
value pollution-saving endeavors from a social perspective, help-
ing to explain the existence of CAFE standards.18 CAFE gains
cannot be induced through market measures (absent a signifi-
cant market-correcting initiative, such as a carbon tax, that,
however sensible, is widely considered infeasible).19 In addition,
nontraditional measures are especially useful to create incen-
tives for actors, such as states, that are not significantly incen-
tivized by market-based innovation rewards.
15 For those hard-core advocates of the view that every stick can be redescribed as a
carrot (and vice versa), our argument is that policymakers should be more willing to
move the baseline-as in our car-fatality example, by changing the default to a large tax
that can be reduced (a carrot) only if the manufacturer exceeds the median rate of safety.
16 See Part I.A.
17 See Part I.C.
18 See Mark R. Jacobsen, Evaluating US Fuel Economy Standards in a Model with
Producer and Household Heterogeneity, 5 Am Econ J: Econ Pol 148, 173-74 (2013) (not-
ing that CAFE regulation seeks to reduce gasoline consumption, which is associated with
external environmental and geopolitical costs).
19 See, for example, Eduardo Porter, Taxes Show One Way to Save Fuel (NY Times,
Sept 11, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/DT95-27CG (noting the recent failure of Pres-
ident Barack Obama's carbon-allowances measure).
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We also stress another point, this one less familiar: innova-
tion is often multimodal-for example, it may occur via technical
change or via "social innovation" (which may be organizational,
political, or related to the formation of new preferences or ways
of living).20 When we are uncertain which mode of innovation is
needed (or cheapest), innovation-promoting tools that are them-
selves agnostic as to the mode of innovation may be desirable.
We may even want tools that can be agnostic as to whether
achievement comes through innovation or through the uptake of
existing innovations. Sticks and nontraditional carrots have this
quality, while traditional exclusion rights do not.
Importantly, nontraditional measures also have significant
shared drawbacks. Most prominently, to be effective, they im-
pose distinctive informational demands on the government-
including, for example, defining the trigger for awarding the
carrot or imposing the stick. Because of the importance of this
problem, we stress one possible strategy to minimize this infor-
mational burden, drawing from the economics literature on
"yardstick competition.21
Up to this point, we have discussed features of an innova-
tion environment that should lead one to consider nontraditional
measures to promote innovation. But a question remains: When
should these be carrots, and when sticks? Part I closes by setting
out some of the theoretical benefits and drawbacks of innovation
sticks as compared to nontraditional carrots. One key benefit of
sticks is that, in equilibrium, they may not need to be paid. In
contrast to the distortions associated with either patent pricing
or the generation of tax revenue for prizes, the threat of penal-
ties for failures to innovate may produce equilibria with fewer
price distortions. Put simply, if a government has a choice be-
tween a threat or a payment to induce innovation, ceteris pari-
bus, the threat will be cheaper. Both will induce parties to ex-
pend resources to innovate, but the payment will also require
the government to raise resources for the reward and so will
trigger the distortions associated with taxation. Relatedly, when
the threat of a stick works to produce innovation, innovators are
not compensated for their efforts. This undercompensation of
20 See notes 91-92.
21 See, for example, Andrei Shleifer, A Theory of Yardstick Competition, 16 Rand J
Econ 319, 319-20 (1985) (defining "yardstick competition" as the comparison of "similar




innovative efforts in the long run may lead innovators to exit
from an industry, which may or may not be a problem. When
sticks are targeted at externalities, they can have salutary ef-
fects even if they reduce activity levels-for example, if cars
whose benefits do not exceed their costs to third parties are
eliminated from the market, this is a social gain, not a loss.
Sometimes, though, we will not want to induce exit as a
penalty for failing to innovate, making the undercompensation
issue more acute. We therefore offer several reasons to think
that the undercompensation problem is less extensive than the
conventional literature suggests, and here, too, we draw on the
insight that innovation is often multimodal. We suggest that the
most important factor in choosing between a stick and a nontra-
ditional carrot is the comparative risk of undercompensation
versus overcompensation. We also identify several other rele-
vant considerations, such as the possibilities that sticks impose
different informational burdens on the government than do car-
rots, that sticks may be difficult for the government to credibly
deploy, and that sticks may have adverse distributional conse-
quences. Sticks also share risks with nontraditional carrots,
such as the risk that parties will game the criteria for success,
and these too must be taken into account. Traditional carrots, of
course, have well-known drawbacks as well (including their own
forms of gaming and rent-seeking22), so the ultimate analysis
will be a comparative one. Importantly, though, we should not
think of the choice as either-or. Innovation sticks can readily be
combined with traditional and nontraditional carrots, and we
suggest below some benefits and risks of a combined approach.
In Part II, we describe several real-world examples of inno-
vation sticks to make our theoretical analysis more accessible.23
As with CAFE, several of our examples target private actors.
But we also provide examples, such as portions of the No Child
Left Behind Act of 200124 (NCLB), in which government actors
have been challenged to improve or else face financial and non-
financial penalties. Some of our examples at least indirectly de-
ploy yardsticks in that the penalty trigger is derived in part
22 See, for example, Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual
Property Law at 220 (cited in note 2).
23 In the Appendix, we also describe several more examples: two drawn from
the environmental context, one related to tobacco control, and one addressing the
use of tort liability as an innovation stick. The Appendix is available online at
http://lawreview.uchicago.edulpage/ayres-kapczynski or from the authors on request.
24 Pub L No 107-110, 115 Stat 1425.
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from what other actors have achieved or will be able to achieve.
Our theory helps us understand why sticks may have been used
in the cases we identify, and it also suggests that many of these
innovation sticks might be more successful if they were more di-
rectly tied to yardstick competition to help determine who is pe-
nalized and how large the penalty will be. We also point out how
broadly the category of sticks can be conceived. Cap-and-trade
systems like the Chicago Climate Exchange-in which more
than 350 firms agreed to greenhouse-emission caps that reduce
emissions by 1 percent per year--combine carrot and stick in-
centives in the selling and buying of rights to innovate to save
energy.25 Even simple prohibitions, such as laws that ban incan-
descent lightbulbs or chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), can be a pow-
erful impetus for innovation.26
The image of the lightbulb going on has been a long-
standing visual metaphor for the moment of creativity. Our
analysis suggests a twist on this conventional image: some inno-
vations are not about a lightbulb turning on, but about a light-
bulb turning off. When the Energy Independence and Security
Act of 200727 ordained that manufacturers would need to cease
manufacturing most incandescent lightbulbs by 2014, industry
participants had strong incentives to create alternative sources
for lighting.28
Seen this way, the concept of innovation sticks is very broad
indeed. After all, every fine and prohibition might lead to inno-
vation, because innovation can permit actors to avoid or lessen
the impact of the penalty.29 The law against homicide, we might
say, does not just prohibit homicide. It also creates incentives for
people to harm others in legal ways or to develop forms of homicide
25 See Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff, Your Personal Climate Exchange (Forbes,
Nov 7, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/P89Y-328X; Ian Ayres, Carrots and Sticks: Un-
lock the Power of Incentives to Get Things Done 138 (Bantam 2010).
26 See Leora Broydo Vestel, Incandescent Bulbs Return to the Cutting Edge (NY
Times, July 5, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/B72Z-FHHH; Ren6 Kemp, et al, Policy
Instruments to Stimulate Cleaner Technologies, in J.B. Opschoor and R.K. Turner, eds,
Economics Incentives and Environmental Policies: Principles and Practice 275, 289 (Kluwer
Academic 1994) (explaining that the general ban on CFCs can be considered a technology-
forcing standard that is strong enough to incentivize CFC-substituting innovations).
27 Pub L No 110-140, 121 Stat 1492.
28 See Vestel, Incandescent Bulbs Return to the Cutting Edge (cited in note 26)
("[Tihe incandescent bulb is turning into a case study of the way government mandates
can spur innovation.").
29 For example, the threat of liability for patent infringement can be seen as an in-
novation stick that incentivizes competitors to innovate around the patent.
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that avoid detection. We are not convinced that the expansiveness
of our concept of innovation sticks is a problem for our account.
Interesting insights might come from thinking about parking
bans and tax systems as sticks that-inadvertently-lead to in-
novation. Our primary interest, however, is not in investigating
the far reaches of the concept but rather in facilitating our abil-
ity to think systematically through the virtues and costs of using
innovation sticks to induce productive kinds of innovation.
In Part III, we offer an example of a yardstick stick mecha-
nism that addresses the significant problem of automobile fatali-
ties in the United States and that we think fairly shows both the
enormous potential and the difficult design issues associated
with ambitious carrot and stick (and indeed, yardstick) ap-
proaches to innovation. We show that identifiable manufactur-
ers and states persistently lag behind the safety levels at-
tained by their peers. For example, we find that just reducing
the automobile-fatality rate in persistently above-median states
would reduce national automobile fatalities by 20 percent, with
an annual social benefit of more than $60 billion. Under one
thought experiment, CAFE-like penalties would be visited on ac-
tors who failed to keep up with what the median actor had
shown was feasible; these penalties would be transferred to re-
ward below-median actors who pioneered safety improvements.
Neither our empiricism nor our CAFE-like fatality proposal is
intended to be definitive. But it is intended to further the plau-
sibility of innovation sticks as a powerful policy tool that de-
serves to be included in policymaking processes.
We do not claim to have exhausted the possible benefits and
drawbacks of innovation sticks, but we instead offer a prelimi-
nary analysis that shows that innovation sticks deserve-and
indeed, already have-a place in the policymaker's tool kit. We
also highlight key considerations that may make them advisable
or inadvisable in particular circumstances. Often the question
will be whether innovation sticks should be used in tandem with
traditional and nontraditional carrots, so that we should consid-
er whether using both carrots and sticks is preferable to relying
merely on carrots.
I. THE CASE FOR STICKS
Mapping out the advantages and disadvantages of sticks re-
quires us to first understand some of the limits of traditional in-
novation carrots and the possible benefits and drawbacks of
20151 1789
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nontraditional carrots, because sticks and nontraditional carrots
have important similarities. After a brief, synthetic review of the
key costs and benefits of traditional and nontraditional carrots,
we define innovation sticks, describe possible implementations
of sticks, and theorize some of their important advantages and
disadvantages. We conclude this Part by drawing out the char-
acteristics of an innovation environment that may lead us to
prefer nontraditional measures over traditional carrots and that
may lead us to choose sticks over nontraditional carrots or to
combine sticks with carrots. Our aim here is not to be fully com-
prehensive of all possible arguments in favor of or against these
various mechanisms but rather to highlight the main concerns
made salient either by the literature or by our own examples.
A. The Role of Nontraditional Innovation Carrots
The existing innovation-economics and IP literature typical-
ly begins with something like the following account:30 infor-
mation is a public good; as such, it is both nonrivalrous and non-
excludable, and it is difficult to produce in competitive markets
absent some form of government intervention. IPRs are such an
intervention: they make information more excludable and so fa-
cilitate the production of information goods in private markets.
There are other approaches to producing public goods, most
prominently government grants, in which governments identify
potential innovators and fund their research work ex ante, and
financial inducement prizes, in which governments offer a finan-
cial reward ex post in exchange for an innovation that, in the
classic model, is freely disseminated.31 Both approaches are ex-
amples of what we call "nontraditional carrots."
The existing literature thus has focused on various forms of
carrots-or incentives to innovators-and in particular on the
trade-offs associated with the use of one kind of carrot or anoth-
er. Both government grants and financial inducement prizes, in
30 For leading accounts of this sort, which of course differ somewhat in their em-
phases and details, see Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Prop-
erty Law at 13-15, 21-24 (cited in note 2); Peter S. Menell and Suzanne Scotchmer, In-
tellectual Property Law, in A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, eds, 2 Handbook of
Law and Economics 1471, 1476-82 (Elsevier 2007); Robert P. Merges, Peter S. Menell,
and Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age 14 (Wolters
Kluwer 5th ed 2010). For an influential article tracing the value of IPRs to the ability of
markets to aggregate information, see Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: An-
other Viewpoint, 12 J L & Econ 1, 11-14 (1969).
31 See Hemel and Ouellette, 92 Tex L Rev at 317-21 (cited in note 4).
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their ideal forms, require free access to the resulting innovations
and so yield information that is priced at marginal cost (that is,
at zero).32 As such, they take advantage of the nonrivalrous na-
ture of information and avoid the efficiency problems associated
with pricing information. Given the inevitability of positive
transaction costs and the impossibility of perfect price discrimi-
nation, IPRs are expected to insert "a wedge between price and
marginal cost, creating deadweight loss."33 This disparity leads
to not only static but also dynamic inefficiencies, because infor-
mation is an input and output of its own production process.34
Nontraditional carrots require taxation and so are also expected
to create deadweight loss. 35 But IPRs create the equivalent of a
tax on a single market, "which is generally thought to impose
greater deadweight loss than the broad-based taxation that gen-
erates general revenue."36 It is for this reason that Professor
Kenneth Arrow long ago insisted that nontraditional carrots are
likely superior to traditional (exclusion-based) carrots as a gen-
eral matter.37
Since Arrow's foundational work, economists have devel-
oped a more refined account of the trade-offs between traditional
and nontraditional carrots. While doing some violence to a very
complex literature, we can identify a few central trade-offs that
are now fairly well understood.38 The main benefit of IPRs is that
they rely on market signals to allocate investment; in particular,
32 See Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get beyond Intellectual
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L Rev 970, 981 (2012) ("[I]nformation only needs to be
produced once for many people to enjoy it; in other words, its marginal cost of production
is zero.").
33 Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law at 22
(cited in note 2).
34 See, for example, Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cu-
mulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J Econ Persp 29, 31 (1991); Benkler, The
Wealth of Networks at 37-38 (cited in note 5).
35 See Kapczynski, 59 UCLA L Rev at 986-87 (cited in note 32).
36 Nancy Gallini and Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best
Incentive System?, in Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner, and Scott Stern, eds, 2 Innovation Pol-
icy and the Economy 51, 54 (MIT 2002). See also Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer, Limit-
ing Patentees' Market Power without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Bene-
fits of Uncertainty and Non-injunctive Remedies, 97 Mich L Rev 985, 991-92 (1999).
37 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for In-
vention, in National Bureau of Economic Research, The Rate and Direction of Inventive
Activity: Economic and Social Factors 609, 623 (Princeton 1962) (noting the importance
of nonpecuniary incentives).
38 For a somewhat more detailed overview, see generally Kapczynski, 59 UCLA L
Rev 970 (cited in note 32).
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they allow markets to establish the value of innovations.39 In-
ducement prizes require governments to establish the value of
the innovations that they seek, but, like IPRs, they can be de-
signed to incentivize decentralized efforts among innovators who
are assumed to have advantages in calculating their costs of in-
novation.40 Government grants, in turn, have special benefits
when racing is expected to be a concern, because the government
can limit the number of entrants.41 Among their important
drawbacks, grants not only require the government to establish
the size of the reward but also require it to decide ex ante who
are likely to be the most successful innovators.42 Both kinds of
nontraditional carrots are often described as having an addi-
tional important drawback-namely, their susceptibility to rent-
seeking and corruption.
43
A newer literature has begun to point out some additional
potential benefits of nontraditional carrots, ones that were earli-
er overlooked. One benefit stems from the fact that excludabil-
ity-the hallmark of IPRs-in fact exists on a continuum and is
not a simple function of legal status.44 An innovator who holds a
legal entitlement to exclude others may in practice be unable or
only weakly able to exclude others. Consider here the difference
between excluding others from a new prescription diet drug in
an environment in which medicines are highly regulated com-
modities and excluding others from using a new exercise regime
that one has invented and validated.45 Exclusion, in fact, is not a
function merely of law but also of norms, technologies, and insti-
tutions. Importantly, some kinds of information goods are likely
39 See id at 982-83. For some, this creates distributive benefits because those who
want innovations pay for them. See, for example, Gallini and Scotchmer, Intellectual
Property at 55 (cited in note 36). The distributive justice effects of innovation policy,
however, are much more complex than this point would suggest. See Kapczynski, 59
UCLA L Rev at 1005 & n 132 (cited in note 32).
40 See Wright, 73 Am Econ Rev at 695 (cited in note 3).
41 See Kapczynski, 59 UCLA L Rev at 985 (cited in note 32) (summarizing the liter-
ature showing that racing among firms to obtain a patent reward can lead to inefficient
entry decisions and social waste).
42 See Wright, 73 Am Econ Rev at 695 (cited in note 3). Shirking may be a special
problem here, too, though it can be mitigated by repeat-player dynamics. See Gallini and
Scotchmer, Intellectual Property at 58 (cited at note 36).
43 See, for example, Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual
Property Law at 9 (cited in note 2). Importantly, IPRs are also vulnerable to rent-
seeking. See Kapczynski, 59 UCLA L Rev at 987 (cited in note 32).
44 See Amy Kapczynski and Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the
Limits of Patents, 122 Yale L J 1900, 1920 (2013).
45 See id at 1928-37.
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to be systematically more amenable to exclusion than others.46
In such cases, market-based exclusion rights will yield inade-
quate incentives to innovate, and they may also distort innova-
tion incentives toward more excludable solutions.47 A nontradi-
tional carrot that does not rely on excludability for its effect,
however, can promote both highly excludable and highly non-
excludable innovation symmetrically and allow the innovator to
choose the better (or cheaper) path to the desired good.
There is a broader way to articulate this point: nontradi-
tional carrots, and in particular inducement prizes, can be de-
signed to be agnostic about the mode of innovation chosen and,
therefore, to promote both excludable and highly nonexcludable
solutions to a problem. For example, a government might offer a
prize for the best means of increasing exercise rates among chil-
dren and award the prize to the party that provided the best ev-
idence of increased exercise, whether through a new (excludable)
dance-based video game or through a popular new (highly non-
excludable) playground game. Prizes can even be designed to be
agnostic about whether improvements come through innovation
or rather through rediscovery or adoption of existing innova-
tions. For example, a government might give every school that
achieved a certain exercise rate among third graders a financial
reward regardless of whether it achieved such a rate through
innovation, adoption, or rediscovery. Exclusion rights instead
require some modicum of originality or novelty and so do not en-
courage actors to select the cheapest and most effective alterna-
tive among as wide a range of activities.48
Another benefit of nontraditional carrots also emerges from
the recent literature. The conventional account, which promotes
46 For example, "uses of information goods that manifest in relatively more im-
material fashion will be more difficult to exclude, because the state of technology makes
monitoring intangible processes (like thoughts) more difficult than monitoring more tan-
gible things." Id at 1920.
47 Because excludability is a continuum, and because it does not vary directly with
social value, traditional carrots also threaten to distort allocative decisions. Imagine an
innovator with two ideas to reduce the health costs of obesity, one of which is technologi-
cal (for example, a pill or an exercise machine, and so highly excludable), and one of
which is nontechnological (for example, a new exercise regime, which must be validated
and so is expensive, but which is highly nonexcludable). Traditional carrots will promote
the former over the latter, even if the latter would cost less or be more effective. For a
description of this point in some detail, see id at 1921-23.
48 See, for example, 35 USC § 102(a) (outlining the novelty requirement in patent
law); Feist Publications, Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co, 499 US 340, 363 (1991) ("As a
constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that
possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity.").
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IPRs because of their allocative advantages, assumes that mar-
kets produce accurate signals for the value of innovation.49 How-
ever, markets in practice are systematically vulnerable to fail-
ure. In neoclassical terms, such failures may result, for example,
from pervasive externalities (such as the pollution caused by
motorists) or from information asymmetries (for example, those
that exist between a sick person and a pharmaceutical company
or between a driver and the car company that designs a car's
safety systems).50 Scholars of behavioral economics and psychol-
ogy instead stress biases in perception or cognition, such as the
"optimism bias," which can discourage consumers from investing
adequately in innovations that reduce the likelihood or cost of
accidents.51 More-foundational critiques of markets also point
out that market-based measures of social value will systemati-
cally underestimate the social value, in welfarist terms, of inno-
vations that serve those with limited ability to pay.52 When
markets are a poor measure of value-because we value things
that are not measured well in markets, or because of systematic
problems with the signals transmitted in market transactions-
then market-based signaling will yield inadequate (and distor-
tive) incentives.
Traditional carrots have not only the advantages but also
the disadvantages of market-based signaling. When markets
fail, signals are distorted. Nontraditional carrots, by contrast,
can directly reflect values or information that are not well pre-
sented in markets. When pollution externalities are ndemic, for
example, exclusion-based solutions such as patents for pollution-
reducing technologies will simply replicate them. By using a
nontraditional carrot, the rewards available to innovators can be
brought closer to their projected social values.53 Markets also
49 See Glenn C. Loury, Market Structure and Innovation, 93 Q J Econ 395, 401-03
(1979) (developing models of R & D investment assuming perfect market valuation).
50 See David J. Bjornstad and Marilyn A. Brown, A Market Failures Framework for
Defining the Government's Role in Energy Efficiency *25 (Joint Institute for Energy &
Environment, June 2004), archived at http://perma.cc/7DGQ-JWSR.
51 Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing through Law, 35 J Legal Stud
199, 207-08 (2006) (explaining that, because of optimism bias, consumers may not ade-
quately assess the risks associated with the products they use).
52 For more on this point, see Kapczynski, 59 UCLA L Rev at 999-1000 (cited in
note 32).
53 The same point can be made with respect to, for example, the divergence be-
tween market value and social value that is generated by the problem of inability to pay.
See id at 993 n 86. A prize or penalty can directly generate incentives to serve poor
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predictably misfire when they depart from competitive condi-
tions, such as when there are significant barriers to market en-
try.54 Imperfect competition exists in many domains, both mar-
ket (as in cases of monopoly and monopsony) and nonmarket (as
for many state-based entities, which may have a captive audi-
ence or effective monopoly). And when this is so, market signals
will likely lead to insufficient innovation, and nontraditional
measures may be superior to traditional carrots.
These newer arguments for the benefits of nontraditional
carrots do not diminish the potential difficulties associated with
such carrots. As noted above, the most important problem with
nontraditional carrots is the significant informational burdens
that they place on governments. For prizes in particular (which
we focus on here as the most similar to innovation sticks), gov-
ernments must establish the size of the carrot and thus must
have a good sense of the value of the desired innovation. Also,
there can be divergence between the things that governments
can measure and the actual underlying phenomena that gov-
ernments want to promote. For example, educators are familiar
with the problem of "teaching to the test."55 If we use test scores
as a measure of student performance and award financial prizes
to high-performing schools, schools will teach to the test; this
can be a problem if the test is an imperfect metric for multi-
dimensional learning. The problem has been stated more broad-
ly as "Campbell's law," which reflects the fact that "[t]he more
any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-
making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and
the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes
it is intended to monitor."56 (Not only may schools neglect im-
portant things that are not in the test but they may also encour-
age cheating by students or lobby to shape the tests in ways that
advantage savvier schools.) This is a serious issue both for those
who design nontraditional carrots and, as we will discuss later,
populations, and it can be set at a level far above the level of incentives that markets
alone would provide. See, for example, id at 997-98.
54 See Daniel F. Spulber, Regulation and Markets 40-42 (MIT 1989).
55 See generally W. James Popham, Teaching to the Test?, 58 Educ Leadership 16
(Mar 2001).
56 Donald T. Campbell, Assessing the Impact of Planned Social Change *49 (Dart-
mouth College Public Affairs Center Occasional Paper Series, Dec 1976), archived at
http://perma.cc/B6DE-WDL8.
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for those who design innovation sticks.57 (IP, we must not forget,
has parallel problems: market signals diverge from social value
whenever there are externalities, wealth effects, or other market
imperfections, and exclusion rights do not symmetrically incen-
tivize different kinds of information production.)58 There are
possible design responses, however, ranging from monitoring to
the development of criteria that more closely track social value.s9
Importantly, a government can use nontraditional carrots
(and sticks) without knowing exactly what it wants in return,
because carrots and sticks can be defined generally or can define
the desired objective in negative terms ("create something other
than this") rather than in positive terms ("create that").60 But be-
cause it must set the level of the reward or fine, the government
inescapably must project something about the costs and benefits
of the desired shift, even if just at the break-even level.
While this projection can be a significant problem, it is im-
portant to note that it can also be mitigated. For example, the
size of a prize need not be determined ex ante but can be decided
ex post, when there may be better information available about
demand.1 A particularly important way to address the information
57 For example, later we will describe Medicare-established "diagnosis-related
groups," which help spur innovation in the ways that hospitals treat patients. The sys-
tem nudges hospitals by capping reimbursements to a level influenced by the average of
treatments for people with similar diagnoses. As Campbell's law suggests, there is a risk
that hospitals will achieve the average in ways that undermine health outcomes-for
example, by turning away sicker patients. See text accompanying notes 167-68.
58 For more on these market imperfections, see, for example, Kapczynski, 59 UCLA
L Rev at 988-90 (cited in note 32).
59 See, for example, James Love and Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimu-
late R&D for New Medicines, 82 Chi Kent L Rev 1519, 1534-43 (2007) (proposing an
R & D prize for pharmaceuticals based on measurements of the quality-adjusted life-
years secured by any given technology).
60 For example, the government can use either a carrot or a stick to push compa-
nies away from the use of certain toxic chemicals or energy-hungry devices. Instead of
specifying what should replace incandescent lightbulbs or CFCs, governments can give
companies incentives (such as tax rebates for alternative units sold) or penalties (such as
fines for offending units sold or emitted) and leave it to others to come up with alterna-
tives. What is inescapable is the government's need to establish some rough accounting
of costs and values in order to determine whether such programs will cost more than the
amount that will be gained. When the government defines a goal in the negative, there is
also the risk that alternatives to the negative will generate similar or worse effects.
CFCs, which are discussed below, provide a real-world example of this problem. See
notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
61 Professor Michael Kremer's patent-buyout provision, which uses an auction
mechanism, is an example of this technique. See Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A
Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q J Econ 1137, 1146-47 (1998). So too is
the model, put forth by Professors Steven Shavell and Tanguy van Ypersele, of a prize
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problem that has not been emphasized in the IP literature in-
volves yardstick incentives, which tie the size of rewards or pun-
ishments to the yardstick of one's peers. In 1985, Professor
Andrei Shleifer's A Theory of Yardstick Competition provided an
elegant stylized model showing why yardstick incentives could
better "assure cost control, prevent waste, and promote cost-
reducing innovation."62 In his model, regulated utilities in differ-
ent cities were allowed to charge customers a yardstick price
equal to the average prices in the other cities. This yardstick
price naturally incorporated both carrot and stick innovation in-
centives: utilities that innovated to reduce their costs below the
average of their peers would earn a carrot of enhanced profits,
while those utilities that fell behind would feel the sting of sell-
ing at a loss.63 Shleifer's model showed that yardstick competi-
tion among the utilities-to garner the carrot and avoid the
stick-was sufficient to induce optimal cost reduction as long as
firms were reasonably identical or had heterogeneities that
could be accounted for.64
For our purposes, it is also worth noting that yardsticks can
be used to set the magnitude of an innovation carrot or stick-
for example, by averaging the accomplishments of the relevant
firms and establishing fines for laggards below a set threshold
(that is, median, or within a certain percentile of the median), or
establishing rewards for those who exceed the average accom-
plishments of their peers. A combination of carrots and sticks, as
Shleifer envisioned, could also be accomplished with rewards
and fines rather than via price setting. The central virtue of
yardsticks in this context would be, as in Shleifer's model, their
ability to help reveal the production costs of firms-here for in-
novation rather than energy production-more directly to gov-
ernments.65 Using yardsticks would minimize the upside risk of
asking far too much of firms and thus generating widespread
exit from an industry, since by definition some percentage of
firms would either meet the standard or have demonstrated that
the result is feasible. Especially if collusion is possible, however,
whose value is established indirectly, by market sales. See Steven Shavell and Tanguy
van Ypersele, Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J L & Econ 525, 541-42 (2001).
62 Shleifer, 16 Rand J Econ at 319 (cited in note 21).
63 In our terms, this kind of yardstick competition would also allow the government
to be agnostic about what technologies were best used to innovate and indeed whether
innovation itself was feasible. More on this in a minute.
64 Shleifer, 16 Rand J Econ at 326 (cited in note 21).
65 See id at 320-21.
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yardsticks could establish thresholds that are too low.66 Allowing
firms to trade liabilities or potential rewards has become common
through the concept of cap and trade, and it may also improve the
efficiency of nontraditional measures to promote innovation.67
Finally, even though the government does not usually know
precisely how an industry will make nonobvious advances over
prior art, some industries are affected by something like Gordon
Moore's innovation "laws," and when they are so affected, they
provide another metric that can reduce information costs for the
government. Just as Moore observed that the number of transis-
tors on integrated circuits tends to double every two years,6 8 pol-
icymakers can take note of the fact that technological innovation
predictably enhances the feasible fuel efficiency every year and
can base future CAFE standards in part on those predicted ad-
vances. Figure 1 in Part III displays a similar innovation trend
with regard to automobile fatalities.
In setting the trigger amount for a nontraditional carrot or
for a stick, the government can either augur what is technologi-
cally possible (A la CAFE) or rely on the yardstick of what com-
petitors have shown to be possible. Each approach has its own
relative strengths. For example, as applied to sticks, the augural
approach might, in equilibrium, avoid the imposition of many
penalties, while the yardstick approach plausibly subjects half
the industry to penalties, with the attendant distortion ineffi-
ciencies associated with those payments. Yardstick sticks by
themselves also might not produce sufficient inframarginal in-
centives. Manufacturers who know that they are likely to fall be-
low the CAFE fleet miles-per-gallon (mpg) cap may have insuffi-
cient incentives to pioneer new fuel-efficiency innovations. One
response to the inframarginal incentive problem would be to
layer different carrot or stick incentives for different margins of
success. Thus, we are attracted to the way that the CAFE penal-
ties are combined with patent rewards to create a carrot-and-stick
regime in which some manufacturers are rewarded via patents for
66 See id at 327 (discussing the problem of collusion).
67 For a formal argument in this regard, see Pnin, Should We Oblige Firms to In-
vest in R&D? at *8-10 (cited in note 6) (describing the virtues of hypothetical tradable
permits to "not invest in R&D").
68 See Gordon E. Moore, Progress in Digital Integrated Electronics, 21 IEDM Tech-
nical Digest 11, 13 (1975).
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pioneering innovations and other manufacturers are punished
via CAFE if they lag behind the possible.69
These strategies can help compensate for the inherent
weaknesses of the measures that we term "nontraditional," but
they do not establish any broad theory of superiority across all
domains. We will return to the question of the circumstances in
which nontraditional carrots and sticks are likely to be prefera-
ble to traditional carrots,0 but first we must have in hand a bet-
ter understanding of innovation sticks.
B. Introducing Innovation Sticks
The IP literature has been focused exclusively on carrot-
based approaches to innovation.71 This is puzzling in part be-
cause the growing carrots-versus-sticks literature suggests that
sticks have potential benefits over carrots.72 Foundational law
and economics work suggests that incentives should be equiva-
lent whether structured as a penalty or as a reward, so that
"any behavioral change induced by promising compliers a $100
reward can also be obtained by threatening violators with a
$100 punishment.73 Recently, De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci
have, however, called attention to certain systematic differences
between carrots and sticks. Most importantly, in equilibrium,
sticks do not need to be paid. Carrots, by contrast, can be used
69 Note, however, that because patent incentives are keyed to markets (and because
of the externalities of pollution), patents here will provide less incentive to engage in pi-
oneering innovation than is socially desirable. See Wright, 73 Am Econ Rev at 691-93
(cited in note 3). Still, the availability of patents may induce some innovation because
consumers value fuel economy (even if less than is socially optimal), and when combined
with sticks, patents can provide insurance against sticks that are too small. Layering
carrots and sticks can also provide protection against the problem of undercompensation.
70 See Part I.C.
71 See, for example, Gallini and Scotchmer, Intellectual Property at 52 (cited in note
36); Wright, 73 Am Econ Rev at 691 (cited in note 3).
72 See generally, for example, Ian Ayres, Carrots and Sticks (cited in note 25) (ex-
plaining the power of "commitment contracts," a type of stick in which one commits to
receiving punishment upon failure to achieve the contracted goal). See also De Geest and
Dari-Mattiacci, Carrots versus Sticks at *2 (cited in note 7) (drawing "a broad picture of
the differences between carrots and sticks" and noting that sticks have many advantages
over carrots); Gerrit De Geest and Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Rise of Carrots and the
Decline of Sticks, 80 U Chi L Rev 341, 349 n 27 (2013).
73 De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci, 80 U Chi L Rev at 347 (cited in note 72). As Profes-
sors De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci point out, this is implicit in R.H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 7 (1960). See De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci, 80 U Chi L Rev
at 354 n 44 (cited in note 72). See also P~nin, Should We Oblige Firms to Invest in R&D?
at *3-4 (cited in note 6) (making a similar reference to Professor Ronald Coase's work).
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up-if they are paid as a reward to one person, they cannot also
be paid to another.74
De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci also gesture to possible differ-
ences between carrots and sticks in behavioral terms. If actors
are subject to loss aversion, for example, then sticks may be
more powerful motivators than carrots, even if the fines and
benefits are otherwise equivalent.75
These same arguments also suggest a potential role for in-
novation sticks. The concept of innovation sticks, however, is
sufficiently unfamiliar that it is worth describing their usage
and effects. Like innovation carrots, innovation sticks come in
many possible forms and share only a basic definitional quality:
they apply penalties to those who do not innovate rather than
offer rewards to those who do. As with carrots, innovation sticks
may be applied to inputs or outputs and may use various met-
rics of success, from the technologically specific to the technolog-
ically agnostic.
Table 1 gives examples in each of these areas and begins to
develop a rudimentary typology of innovation sticks. (Table 1
also includes analogous carrots in each case to help reveal the
symmetries and differences between carrots and sticks in this
domain.)
74 See De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci, Carrots versus Sticks at *14-16 (cited in note 7).
This conclusion relies on a stylized set of assumptions-for example, that sticks do not
have any economic or distributional effects. See id at *10. In addition, as the literature
on racing makes clear, sometimes carrots clearly induce efforts without having to be
paid. Indeed, this is a canonical definition of a race: only the winner receives the reward,
but many others exert themselves to try to reach the goal. See Kapczynski, 59 UCLA L
Rev at 984 (cited in note 32).
75 See De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci, Carrots versus Sticks at *26 (cited in note 7)
("[Wlhen agents have loss aversion ... negative incentives may be more effective than
positive incentives."). One of us is a cofounder of a website, www.stickK.com, that lever-
ages loss aversion by letting users put money at risk if they fail to reach their goals. See
Michael Abramowicz and Ian Ayres, Commitment Bonds, 100 Georgetown L J 605, 616
(2012). Sticks, like carrots, may also crowd out intrinsic motivation and thereby dampen
innovative efforts. See Bruno S. Frey and Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J
Econ Surveys 589, 589 (2001) (surveying the empirical support for the idea that "exter-
nal intervention via monetary incentives or punishments may undermine, and under
different identifiable conditions strengthen, intrinsic motivation"). Presumably, wealth
effects may also be important in understanding the differential impact of carrots and
sticks. In considering various behavioral-economic impacts, it may also be important to
distinguish between individual and corporate inventors.
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TABLE 1. TYPOLOGY OF INNOVATION STICKS
Metric for Success
Technology Specific Technology Agnostic
Researcher who fails to
spend X hours on
researching electric cars is
fined
[Grants for electric car
researchers]
Company that fails to
spend X amount on
research to improve
batteries is fined
[Grants or R & D tax
credits for companies that
engage in battery
research]
Researcher who fails to
create new battery type is
fined
[Patents or prizes for new
batteries]
Car company that fails to
market electric cars is
fined
[Patents or prizes for elec-
tric cars]
Researcher who fails to spend
X hours on research is fined
[Grants that are agnostic about
research domain-for example,
grants for National Institutes
of Health programs]
Company that fails to spend X
amount on general R & D is
fined; effectively a
regressive tax on R & D
expenditures
[Grants or R & D tax credits for
R & D broadly defined]
Researcher who fails to
produce innovations that
diminish emissions is fined
[Patents or prizes for
emissions-reducing
technologies or strategies]
Car company that fails to
decrease pollution emissions in
its fleet by X amount is fined
[Patents or prizes for emissions-
reducing technologies or strat-
egies]
These different forms of incentives impose distinctive infor-
mational demands on the government. Some of the inform-
ational demands that sticks make are also present for nontradi-
tional carrots. For example, for sticks as well as for prizes and
grants, government actors need good information on the value of
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the innovation they are seeking.76 Technology-specific incentives
likely require better information than more-general incentives
to innovate, as picking a very specific winner (electric cars) may
be harder than picking a general aim (reducing pollution). For
those carrots and sticks that are keyed to inputs rather than
outputs, there is a risk of shirking or waste.77
More interesting are the areas in which the information re-
quirements of innovation sticks diverge from those of equivalent
nontraditional carrots.78 Innovation sticks would seem for one
reason in particular to require more information than do non-
traditional carrots: with sticks, the government needs good in-
formation about the potential set of innovators-but because
people will not self-nominate for sticks, governments must iden-
tify potential innovators without their help.79 When the govern-
ment awards carrots, individuals will come forward, as occurs
when potential innovators apply for government grants. There is
a concomitant risk that people will falsely nominate them-
selves-for example, by overstating their potential merit as re-
searchers or by gaming the definition of a prize. But the costs of
detecting lying and cheating, particularly in a repeat-player
76 Importantly, though it is not often stressed, the government also faces infor-
mation problems when defining the contours of exclusive-rights regimes, such as in de-
termining patent duration or the set of exclusive rights available in copyright. See Amy
Kapczynski, Intellectual Property's Leviathan, 77 L & Contemp Probs 131, 140-42 (2014).
77 Although we do not pursue the issue here, it seems likely that there are differ-
ences between carrots and sticks from a behavioral perspective. For example, loss aver-
sion might make individuals who are facing sticks less likely to shirk. However, some of
the sticks we identify are so far from the current baseline and so violative of basic liberal
commitments (for example, of the freedom of research) that their effects on individuals
might well be counterproductive.
78 We focus here on nontraditional carrots, because traditional carrots make use of
markets to provide key informational signals. See Kapczynski, 59 UCLA L Rev at 982-
83 (cited in note 32). Sticks that would do the same are very difficult to imagine. (Per-
haps the government might create a tax on low sales, for example, assuming that com-
panies with low sales are less innovative. But the sales-markets, that is-would set the
level of the fine.) The trade-offs between sticks and nontraditional carrots on the one
hand and market-based exclusion rights with respect to information on the other are dis-
cussed in some detail above. See Part I.A.
79 Even if the government established a default fine, thus prompting individuals to
come forward to claim an exemption, the government would still have to define at the
outset the appropriate targets for the fine. With a prize, the government might leave
that set open, suggesting that anyone who could build a better mousetrap could come
forward to claim the reward. It seems far less plausible to fine everyone who fails to
build a better mousetrap and revoke the fine for the set of individuals who come forward.
It would also almost certainly penalize people with no capacity to innovate in the rele-
vant way, raising a distributional concern that we discuss later. See text accompanying
notes 84-86.
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environment, are plausibly smaller, at least much of the time,
than the efforts needed to define the potential set of innovators.
Finally, carrots seem to have informational advantages
when upper limits to performance are hard to define.80 Sticks
create thresholds below which parties must not fall and are con-
sequently preferable when the lower limit is known and clear.
For example, sticks are good for enforcing rules about when to
get to work (when it is clear that it is best if all employees get to
work by 9:00 a.m. and there is no value in getting there earlier),
but carrots may work better when individuals' sales quotas are
concerned if management does not know in advance what the
possible sales amounts are.81 Nonobvious innovation is a domain
in which it may often be difficult to determine upper limits. But
many other modes of innovation-including the diffusion of
know-how that is required to figure out how to get an idea to
work in a different setting-may present domains in which the
lower limit is more knowable.
Put more generally, as De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci have
noted in recent work, sticks may be best in "simple" settings, in
which "citizens have more or less equal compliance costs and the
lawmaker knows these costs and asks for equal efforts from all
citizens."82 In such cases, "sticks are superior because the law-
maker can easily set them high enough so that all citizens com-
ply," thereby reducing costs as well as the distortions associated
with the need to raise money to pay out for carrots.8 3 But in
more-complex circumstances, lawmakers may know little about
what to expect from each citizen84 and may also presumably
have difficulty knowing exactly how to define what they want. It
may be relatively easy to determine who should be forbidden to
commit assault and easy to set the size of the penalty and define
the forbidden act. But it may be much more difficult to decide
who should build a better lightbulb, and it may also be difficult
to know the costs and precise criteria of determining the success
80 See, for example, Edward P. Lazear, Labor Economics and the Psychology of Or-
ganizations, 5 J Econ Persp 89, 104 (1991) (discussing situations in which performance
output or input has no value above or below some critical value); De Geest and Dari-
Mattiacci, 80 U Chi L Rev at 349 n 26 (cited in note 72) (noting that the ease of setting
limits to performance influences the choice between carrots and sticks).
81 See De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci, 80 U Chi L Rev at 349 n 26 (cited in note 72).
82 Id at 345.
83 Id.
84 See id (noting, in particular, that governments "may not know which citizen
should spend time composing songs").
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of that lightbulb.85 In addition, when the government requires
particular efforts from certain citizens, it runs a risk of singling
out precisely those individuals whose cooperation is most need-
ed, causing distributional distortions and "artificially impover-
ishing those from whom much is required."86 This is one reason
why some of the sticks described above-for example, imposing
fines on researchers who fail to invent a new form of battery-
seem particularly ill-advised. Importantly, though, the govern-
ment will sometimes have good information about the set of po-
tential innovators as well as the value of their innovations. The
CAFE standards, described below, are a good example because
the government understands a great deal about the risks of cli-
mate change and the contributions made by the transportation
sector.87
Innovation sticks also have a second major drawback in the
innovation domain: they do not compensate innovators for their
investments.88 One reason that the IP literature focuses so
strongly on carrots may be that it assumes that, in equilibrium,
compensation is required to obtain sufficient levels of invest-
ment in innovation. That in turn is because innovation is as-
sumed to be expensive and to result in discrete goods that can be
readily copied by competitors and that have a universal (or at
least widespread) utility.89 These assumptions drive the conclu-
sion that some form of compensation-whether via exclusion
rights or government funding-is needed to produce innovation
in adequate amounts under competitive conditions.
One response to this problem will be discussed in a mo-
ment:90 innovation sticks can be applied along with traditional or
nontraditional carrots, and when these tools are combined, this
85 To refer back to our earlier conversation, these difficulties should be compared to
the difficulties of the alternative modes of influencing the allocation of inventive efforts.
See Part I.A. For example, if carbon emissions are too cheap, then markets (and conse-
quently, patents) also have a serious allocative problem. In other words, the information
problem in question is a comparative one, and it cannot obviously be resolved in favor of
markets once we have a more realistic picture of markets in view.
86 De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci, 80 U Chi L Rev at 345 (cited in note 72).
87 See Part II.A. Notably, the companies affected by the CAFE standards are also
free to contract with others to find the cheapest means of meeting their regulatory bur-
dens. When such contracting is possible, the quality of government information about
who will be the best innovator is less important.
88 See De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci, 80 U Chi L Rev at 363 (cited in note 72).
89 See, for example, Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual
Property Law at 17 (cited in note 2); Wright, 73 Am Econ Rev at 691 (cited in note 3).
90 See Part I.C.
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will help address problems of undercompensation. Importantly,
though, innovation sticks may also be useful in other domains in
which carrots are either unavailable or ineffective. We have in
mind two domains in which sticks may be used without associ-
ated carrots: domains in which free rider effects are absent
(though not, we assume, because of exclusion rights) and do-
mains in which market disciplines do not apply to actors (and so
when exit will not be the result of the application of penalties).
We address these two issues in turn.
First, free rider effects do not always accompany innovation.
Information is not always expensive, not always readily copied,
and not always useful to a broad range of competitors. It is in-
creasingly clear that innovation has many modes, only some of
which correlate well to the assumptions of the public-goods ac-
count of information.91 For example, there is a growing literature
on "social innovation, 92 a term used, inter alia, to refer to inno-
vations that restructure relations within organizations or organ-
izations themselves, to process-oriented innovations aimed at
solving social problems (such as traffic regulations or medical
screenings), to political innovations (such as ideas for legislation
or social programs), and to innovations in "lifestyle" (such as
how to express one's values or aspirations or how to allocate
one's resources).93 Even technological innovation need not have
the qualities of public goods,94 but these other modes of innovation
are still more likely to evade one or more of the requirements of
the public-goods account. For example, these modes of innovation
91 This is a corollary to the point about nonexcludability raised above. See Part I.A.
There, we note that different modes of innovation may be differently excludable even in
the presence of exclusion rights, with the implication that public-goods problems can ex-
ist that exceed exclusion rights' power to remedy. Here, we point out that different
modes of innovation may also generate greater or fewer public-goods problems. When
there are few public-goods problems, undercompensation is much less of a risk and over-
compensation may well be a greater concern.
92 The term "social innovation" is used in many different disciplines and is subject
to many definitions. See generally Dominik Riede and Kathrin Lurtz, Mapping the Var-
ious Meanings of Social Innovation: Towards a Differentiated Understanding of an Emerg-
ing Concept (EBS Business School, July 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/2ZX7-PAQR.
93 See generally Wolfgang Zapf, The Role of Innovations in Modernization Theory, 1
Intl Rev Sociology 83 (1991). The term "social innovation" is also used in many other
ways, for example, in referring to new modes of "need satisfaction," a category that in-
cludes technological innovations such as the personal automobile. Id at 88. See also
Ruiede and Lurtz, Mapping the Various Meanings of Social Innovation at *4-5 (cited in
note 92).
94 For example, technological innovation is not necessarily nonexcludable without
law if secrecy is effective. It also does not face substantial free rider problems if it is use-
ful to only one party or needs modification before it can be useful to others.
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may be relatively inexpensive and thus endemic to certain social
circumstances. This holds even under conditions of free copying.
(For example, this category would include minor legislative re-
forms or simple changes to organizational workflow.) Some such
innovations may result in goods that have utility for only a
small number of people (as when a human resources department
figures out how to resolve a dispute between two employees) or
that are difficult to copy and therefore not subject in any mean-
ingful way to the problem of nonexcludability. Finally, some
forms of innovation might be best understood as processes
themselves-which is to say, as practices of continual revision
that produce not discrete, stable products that may be copied
but rather an ongoing string of minor innovations that have
been revised by the time they might be visible to others.
95
In this Article, we adopt a broad conception of what it
means to innovate. Innovation includes not only the invention of
a new technique or mechanism that is expensive and subject to
free riding in the absence of exclusion rights but also the inven-
tion of new techniques and mechanisms that are inexpensive or
that do not face free rider problems-either because they are
useful only to a few or because they are rapidly updated in a
fashion that leaves natural lead time in place. For us, innova-
tion policy should also appropriately incentivize the diffusion of
information insofar as it may require one kind of innovation for
someone to learn what another already knows and another kind
of innovation for someone to learn how to translate that learning
to practice in a particularized setting. Because undercompensa-
tion may be less of a risk than overcompensation in these alter-
native forms of innovation, sticks may play an important role.
A possible objection arises: If these other modes of innova-
tion lack the indicia associated with the IP and innovation-
economics literature, are they consequently uninteresting from a
policy perspective because they are likely to be produced in ade-
quate amounts without any particular social intervention? In
some cases, perhaps so.96 When the conventional public-goods
95 We can think of this domain as one in which a first-mover advantage sufficient to
incentivize innovation still exists. See, for example, J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and
Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 Vand L Rev 1743,
1770 (2000) (explaining that when innovation costs are low, a first-mover advantage is
available).
96 We set aside here the possible interactions between innovation policy and disclo-
sure. While information that can be kept secret may be adequately incentivized, there
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qualities of information are lacking, competitive markets might
be expected to perform well. If our local grocery store, for exam-
ple, internalizes much of the value of improvements in its organ-
izational workflow, and if such innovation is cheap, impossible
to copy, or not valuable to competitors, then we can assume that
such innovation will occur in adequate amounts without the
need for additional policy interventions.
But innovation markets sometimes fail. Innovation sticks
can help calibrate incentives when this is so, and they may be
especially useful precisely when potential innovators face only
modest free riding risks but existing market conditions generate
too little demand for innovation from a social perspective. Simi-
larly, when there are significant barriers to market entry-as in
the case of a monopsony or monopoly, or when the relevant
players are state actors that are insulated from competition-we
need not worry as much that undercompensation will lead to exit
from an industry.
C. The Costs and Benefits of Sticks
To synthesize the foregoing discussion, the case for innova-
tion sticks shares much in common with the case for nontradi-
tional carrots: both sticks and nontraditional carrots may be es-
pecially useful in situations in which we worry about the
deadweight losses associated with exclusive rights in infor-
mation and in which market signals diverge in predictable ways
from what we desire as a social matter. They are also particular-
ly useful to provide incentives to actors that do not operate in a
competitive-market setting or that are precluded from profiting
from exclusion rights. In addition, both sticks and nontradition-
al carrots can be designed to be agnostic as to the form of inno-
vation used, as well as to whether improvements come through
new innovations, greater adoption and dissemination of existing
innovations, or rediscovery of old innovations.
Sticks and nontraditional carrots also have downsides: in
particular, they are information intensive. Regulated actors may
also game the criteria of success or try to influence these criteria
to their advantage. There are risks here, including the risk of
amplifying the advantages of large players and incumbents, who
might have better resources than new entrants and so be better
may be social welfare problems with allowing or encouraging secrecy insofar as that in-
formation is valuable to others (or "nonrivalrous," in conventional terms).
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able to mobilize to meet-and also to change-the governmental
criteria. We do not mean to downplay these problems. But we do
mean to suggest that they are not a fortiori more troubling than
the disadvantages associated with IPRs (which include a ten-
dency to favor incumbents).97
A further question arises: When might we prefer sticks to
nontraditional carrots? The central insight that we draw from
the above analysis is that if compensation is not required to in-
duce innovation, and if efficiency is our metric, sticks will be
preferable to nontraditional carrots. "Carrots may distort by
overpaying; sticks by underpaying"m--but when compensation is
not required, the only risk is of distortion by overpaying. Though
the existing theoretical account on which the IP and innovation
literature is based tends to assume that undercompensation is
the chief risk, there is more and more recognition that, outside
of a few special fields (such as pharmaceuticals), conventional
competitive markets may in fact generate sufficient information
without additional rewards.99 In such cases, carrots will over-
compensate and yield distortions. These distortions stem from
both the taxes required to fund the reward and the excessive ef-
fort or racing that may attend the overcompensation. If markets
are otherwise functioning well, no intervention at all may be
needed in these cases. But when there are pervasive externali-
ties or when the targets are nonmarket actors, sticks are likely
to be a better innovation tool than nontraditional carrots.
Put another way, sticks are especially appropriate when we
expect that the needed innovations do not have the conventional
97 IP may advantage incumbents, too, who similarly can organize to influence the
nature of IP law and so perpetuate their advantage. Professor Yochai Benkler has ar-
gued that IP has centralizing effects, because those who buy up larger stocks of
knowledge can avoid the transaction costs of purchasing licenses on the open market.
Incumbents can impose asymmetric costs on more-open innovators because they can ex-
clude open innovators but are not themselves excluded from more-open innovation. See,
for example, Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information
Production, 22 Intl Rev L & Econ 81, 88-89 (2002) (noting that integration among mul-
tiple incumbent firms "avoids transaction costs associated with purchase of information
inputs owned by others").
98 De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci, 80 U Chi L Rev at 368 (cited in note 72) (emphasis
omitted).
99 See Richard Posner, Do Patent and Copyright Law Restrict Competition and Cre-
ativity Excessively? (The Becker-Posner Blog, Sept 30, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/9VWY-X2XK (suggesting that the ostensible need for patents in in-
ventive industries has been overestimated). See also Michele Boldrin and David K.
Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly 4 (Cambridge 2008) (arguing that patent protec-
tion is primarily used to prevent economic progress and hurt competitors).
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qualities of public goods (for example, if they stem from forms of
social innovation that may be low cost or valuable to only a sin-
gle entity) but we are nonetheless concerned that market-based
signals will not suffice to induce the innovation we want. Among
other reasons, this may be because of pervasive externalities
that are practically or politically difficult to address with a gen-
eral tax, or because the target entities are sheltered from mar-
ket pressures. Nontraditional carrots, in turn, have a compara-
tive advantage when public-goods issues (or free rider problems)
are present but exclusion rights are inappropriate-for example,
when exclusion rights are ineffective, are distortive, or generate
unacceptable deadweight loss.
Other factors, too, are relevant to the choice between sticks
and nontraditional carrots. Both are information intensive and
may, for this reason alone, be inappropriate in many cases. To
implement innovation sticks, the government must identify po-
tential innovators and establish a value for the innovation de-
sired.100 If the government knows little about the value of differ-
ent dishwasher designs, for example, it cannot design a good
system to induce the innovation of dishwashers. But if it does
have good information-for example, if it "knows" better than
markets the true long-term cost of the energy consumption of a
dishwasher-then nontraditional measures may indeed be ap-
propriate regarding this dimension. Whether the information
costs of sticks will be higher than those of nontraditional carrots
will be case specific, and it will depend significantly on whether
the government is reasonably able to determine the plausible set
of innovators (or the ease of contracting thereafter). Also im-
portant is whether the aim is to establish a uniform lower bound
(favoring sticks) or to direct efforts toward an unknown upward
bound (favoring nontraditional carrots).101
There may also be differences between carrots and sticks
regarding the government's ability to credibly deploy one or the
other. As we will see in Part II, the government has, in several
of our examples, stopped short of applying penalties when it
100 In some settings, the government's task is to identify the innovators or the enti-
ties who are well placed to serve as Coasean contractors. The threat of CAFE penalties,
for example, gave laggard car manufacturers good incentives to license innovations to
improve their fleets' fuel efficiency. See Part II.A.
101 Foreshadowing our examples to come, it is perhaps not surprising that sticks
have been widely used in the environmental context because of the feasibility of estab-
lishing a uniform threshold-such as for energy use or for the use of harmful chemi-
cals-that we wish to apply broadly to all actors. See Part II.A.1.
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became clear that the desired innovations-for example, in zero-
emissions automobiles-were not forthcoming. This suggests
that it may be difficult for the government to credibly commit to
the deployment of sticks, perhaps more so in the domain of in-
novation than elsewhere. De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci, notably,
make the opposite point regarding sticks generally: because
sticks generate revenue for the government rather than require
expenditures, De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci suggest that a down-
side of sticks is that they may be too easy for governments to
deploy and thus may have more potential for abuse.12 This may,
however, be context specific and dependent on both the social
meaning of the activity in question and the actors who are tar-
geted. For example, it may be easy for the government to over-
use sticks as applied to convicted felons, who are easily stigma-
tized and politically weak (and often disenfranchisedl03). But it
may be much more difficult for the government to apply sticks to
powerful industries that are being asked to do something per-
ceived as affirmative-namely, to innovate-in a context in
which firms may be able to credibly complain that the task was
impossible and to exert political influence to resist the sticks.
104
Nontraditional carrots face less resistance from their targets but
more resistance from those who foot the bill. But nontraditional
carrots such as prizes may also face a credibility problem, be-
cause governments may have incentives to renege after innova-
tors have sunk their costs.105 The point about political economy
might be generalized this way: Sticks may in general be more
credible against small and politically weak actors, but by the
same token, they are more prone to abuse against these same
actors. Carrots may be more credible when applied to large and
politically powerful actors, but by the same token, the govern-
ment may be more likely to overuse carrots against these actors
and underuse sticks. Whether sticks or nontraditional carrots
102 See De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci, Carrots versus Sticks at *16 (cited in note 7).
103 See Elizabeth Hull, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-felons 29-30 (Temple 2006).
104 See, for example, Steven L. Puller, The Strategic Use of Innovation to Influence
Regulatory Standards, 52 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 690, 690 (2006) (noting that firms may
behave strategically by failing to innovate to meet regulatory standards when they are
not "regulation-takers").
105 See Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives at 32 n 2 (cited in note 3) (citing sever-
al historical examples in which governments may have reneged on prize promises). Con-
tract law or reputational concerns might help mitigate this problem for carrots. We
thank Professor Alan Schwartz for pressing us on this point.
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face greater credibility problems may thus be context specific
and is another relevant consideration for policymakers.
Sticks and nontraditional carrots may also have different
implications from a behavioral or distributive perspective. In
part because of the aforementioned malleability of baselines,106
context is likely important. But context may be of nontrivial im-
portance to policy if, for example, a stick requires that those ac-
tors from whom we seek great effort also bear a significant risk
of penalty-particularly if penalties are understood in a social,
rather than a Coasean, fashion as punishments that generate
particular aversion and approbation. In addition, distribution can
also affect efficiency, as it does when wealth effects are present.07
Finally, policymakers can deploy carrots and sticks (wheth-
er traditional or nontraditional) together and may often wish to
do so. Some forms of yardsticks employ both carrots and sticks,
as described above.108 And whenever sticks are applied, if patent
law applies in relevant ways to the field in question, those sticks
will work in conjunction with traditional carrots. In fact, in
many cases, sticks may be most useful in conjunction with car-
rots, so that carrots can help incentivize pioneers and sticks can
help encourage laggards or correct market failures that are not
addressed in other ways. There are additional complexities
raised by the use of these tools together, however. The design of
each should be appropriate to the concerns identified above (so
that, for example, the carrots are well calibrated to the domain
in which undercompensation is a concern). We also leave for an-
other day certain questions that arise when these tools are used
together, such as the potential anticompetitive effects that may
arise when traditional carrots are combined with sticks.109
Ultimately, once all these different tools are brought into view,
we face the ordinary-and difficult-questions about efficiency
106 See note 13 and accompanying text.
107 As we discuss below, if one result of innovation sticks in the educational context
were that schools with few resources ended up with still-fewer resources against a back-
drop in which resources are not justly distributed, this would be undesirable on distribu-
tive grounds and on efficiency grounds. See Part II.B.2.
108 See text accompanying notes 62-64.
109 For example, requiring every manufacturer to use a new, environmentally
friendly technology might bestow excessive market power on the technology owner. In
such settings, compulsory licenses may be appropriate. See, for example, 42 USC § 7608
(allowing the attorney general to require the owner of any patent that is not "reasonably
available" to license the patent if such licensing is necessary to comply with certain as-
pects of the Clean Air Act and if "there are no reasonable alternative methods" to achieve
compliance).
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trade-offs. We do not claim here that innovation sticks are better
than the alternatives. Rather, we attempt to establish a set of
important (but preliminary and noncomprehensive) considera-
tions that should inform their use and that can help policymak-
ers decide among traditional carrots, nontraditional carrots, and
sticks--or that might lead us to combine some of the above.110
II. EXISTING EXAMPLES
The theoretical case for innovation sticks made above is suffi-
cient to suggest, under limited circumstances, the efficacy of
threatening penalties for a failure to innovate. In this Part, we
show that innovation sticks have already been implemented as a
tool of federal policy to induce producers and states to innovate in
order to improve performance in a variety of contexts. We develop
several examples from the environmental context because of the
importance and prevalence of sticks in this domain, and we then
develop examples from other settings to illustrate the very diverse
contexts in which sticks have been deployed or contemplated.
A. CAFE and Other Producer Penalties
1. Environmental sticks.
More than 30 percent of US greenhouse gas emissions are
attributable to the transportation sector."1 Increases in fuel effi-
ciency are thus important to efforts against climate change and
may also help mitigate the security and foreign affairs problems
associated with the US reliance on fossil fuels. Consumers are
not expected to internalize the benefits of the long-term envi-
ronmental and political gains associated with improved fuel effi-
ciency, making this area one that has long been the subject of
regulation.112
110 It is also worth noting that innovation sticks generate feedback information and
can be adjusted accordingly. Ideally, sticks are not applied or are applied rarely. Sticks
will be applied frequently when they are poorly designed and fail to induce effort or ex-
pect too much effort, suggesting a possible need for revision. See De Geest and Dari-
Mattiacci, 80 U Chi L Rev at 371-72 (cited in note 72). As this suggests, one important
point of comparison between different innovation mechanisms should be their relative
openness to feedback, as well as their general adaptability and adjustability.
111 Christopher R. Knittel, Automobiles on Steroids: Product Attribute Trade-Offs and
Technological Progress in the Automobile Sector, 101 Am Econ Rev 3368, 3368 (2011).
112 See Jacobsen, 5 Am Econ J: Econ Pol at 178 (cited in note 18) (noting that
"[clonsumer myopia... favors CAFE in order to correct consumer mistakes").
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In 1975, Congress enacted the first CAFE standards in the
aftermath of fuel shortages brought about by the Arab oil em-
bargo of 1973-1974.113 These standards set a fuel-economy
standard in mpg that each car manufacturer has to meet for its
fleet of new passenger cars in a given model year.114 The stand-
ards were quite stringent in their early years, but they effective-
ly stagnated in the 1980s, in part due to increases in the relative
sales of light trucks and SUVs (which have generally been sub-
ject to more-lenient CAFE standards).15 Very recently, new reg-
ulations were promulgated to substantially toughen fuel-
economy requirements under CAFE: by 2025, manufacturers
will be required to almost double the average fuel economy of
new passenger cars and light trucks, which is projected to cut in
half greenhouse gas emissions as compared to the 2010 fleet.116
The CAFE standards are a prime example of a regulatory
innovation stick. If a car manufacturer fails to comply with the
fuel-economy requirement in a given model year, it must pay
civil penalties.11, Under current regulations, the penalty totals
$55.00 for each mpg that falls short of the set mileage standard,
multiplied by the manufacturer's total production for the domes-
tic market.118 Such penalties are not trivial in real terms, and
many manufacturers appear to have treated them as a "binding
constraint."119
113 See Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), Pub L No 94-163, 89 Stat 871
(1975), codified as amended in various sections of Titles 15 and 42; David L. Greene,
CAFE or Price? An Analysis of the Effects of Federal Fuel Economy Regulations and Gas-
oline Price on New Car MPG, 1978-89, 11 Energy J 37, 37-38 (1990) (recounting how the
EPCA was a direct response to the fuel-price shock caused by the oil embargo). For an
overview of the development of the CAFE standards since 1975, see Laura Hall, Note,
The Evolution of CAFE Standards: Fuel Economy Regulation Enters Its Second Act, 39
Transp L J 1, 7-16 (2011).
114 See EPCA § 301, 89 Stat at 902-03.
115 See Knittel, 101 Am Econ Rev at 3368 (cited in note 111). For a discussion of the
difference between cars and light trucks or SUVs, see NRC, CAFE Report at 1 (cited in
note 10) (noting that in 2002 the CAFE standards were "27.5 mpg for passenger cars and
20.7 mpg for light trucks").
116 77 Fed Reg at 62627 (cited at note 12). See also Bill Vlasic, U.S. Sets Higher Fuel
Efficiency Standards (NY Times, Aug 28, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/55M9-MRJQ.
117 See 49 USC §§ 32911-12. CAFE also permits some banking and trading of cred-
its for companies that exceed the standards, so the central stick of the regulation is sup-
plemented with a kind of a carrot. See 77 Fed Reg at 62649 (cited in note 12).
118 49 CFR § 578.6(h)(2).
119 Donald Warren MacKenzie, Fuel Economy Regulations and Efficiency Technolo-
gy Improvements in U.S. Cars since 1975 *125 (unpublished PhD dissertation, MIT, June
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/D7CC-CJVS. See also Jacobsen, 5 Am Econ J: Econ
Pol at 156 (cited in note 18). A few companies-such as BMW and Mercedes-Benz, which
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In setting the current CAFE standards, the National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)-the agency re-
sponsible for implementing the standards via rulemaking-is
required by law to mandate "the maximum feasible average fuel
economy level that it decides the manufacturers can achieve in
that model year" after considering four statutory factors:
"[t]echnological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of
other standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the
need of the nation to conserve energy."120
The CAFE program has long been understood to be technol-
ogy forcing.121 The agency interprets its statutory mandate as a
requirement to set standards that "make it necessary for manu-
facturers to engage in research and development in order to
bring a new technology to market."122 However, the agency has
also historically been cautious in projecting the pace of change,
often keying its demands to technologies that have been proved
or are close to fruition.123 The agency does not limit itself to
technologies that are already in existence, but in a short rule-
making time frame it will look just a few years into the future.124
The recent increases in CAFE standards were accompanied by a
much longer regulatory time frame (projecting out to the year
2025), so the agency considered not only "near term" technolo-
gies but also technologies "that are beyond the initial research
produce relatively small volumes of luxury vehicles-have chosen instead to violate the
standard each year since model year 1987 and, in turn, have paid around $500 million in
fines. See id at 155-56; Vehicle Fuel Economy: Reforming Fuel Economy Standards
Could Help Reduce Oil Consumption by Cars and Light Trucks, and Other Options
Could Complement These Standards *24 (GAO, Aug 2007), archived at
http://perma.cc/3Z2Q-7F82.
120 77 Fed Reg at 62627 (cited in note 12). The agency has discretion to balance
these factors. Center for Biological Diversity v National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration, 538 F3d 1172, 1195 (9th Cir 2008) ("The EPCA clearly requires the agency to
consider these four factors, but it gives NHTSA discretion to decide how to balance the
statutory factors-as long as NHTSA's balancing does not undermine the fundamental
purpose of the EPCA: energy conservation.).
121 See, for example, Center for Auto Safety v National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration, 793 F2d 1322, 1339 (DC Cir 1986), quoting S Rep No 94-179, 94th Cong,
1st Sess 9 (1975) ("Congress created mandatory vehicle fuel economy standards, intend-
ed to be technology forcing, with the recognition that 'market forces ... may not be
strong enough to bring about the necessary fuel conservation which a national energy
policy demands."').
122 77 Fed Reg at 63015 (cited in note 12).
123 See id at 62668 (noting that the agency considers "technological feasibility" to
exist when "a particular method of improving fuel economy can be available for commer-
cial application in the model year for which a standard is being established").
124 See id.
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phase, and are under development and expected to be in produc-
tion in the next 5-10 years.125 As a result, the agency engaged
in what it called "augural" projections, meaning that the projec-
tions "represent NHTSA's current best estimate, based on the
information available to the agency today, of what levels of
stringency might be maximum feasible in those model years."126
CAFE is thus a particularly interesting example for our purpos-
es, both because it is deliberately modeled and understood as a
stick-based regime to promote innovation and because in its lat-
est iteration it has explicitly relied on agency efforts to project
and demand technology beyond that which currently exists.127
There is also a significant body of literature evaluating the
effects of the CAFE program. It is difficult to decisively distin-
guish the impact of the regulations from those of other back-
ground conditions, in particular from the impact of changes in
gasoline prices. But many analyses have concluded that the pro-
gram has had positive effects, particularly-though not only-
because it has pushed companies to innovate in the area of fuel
economy.128 A comprehensive evaluation of the program was
completed in 2002, after Congress charged a special committee
within the National Academy of Sciences to investigate the effi-
cacy of the CAFE standards.29 That committee noted that fuel
125 Id at 62642-43. The agency also noted that it did not set standards based entire-
ly on conjecture. Id at 63015 ("[]t would not be reasonable for the agency to predicate
stringency on completely unforeseen future improvements in unknown technologies.").
Some believed that the agency should do more, urging it to set standards based on more
actuarial estimations. See id (describing the views of the Center for Biological Diversity).
The agency demurred, citing its additional statutory obligation to consider economic
practicability. Id.
126 77 Fed Reg at 62627 (cited in note 12). Because the statute requires the agency
not to set standards more than five model years at a time, these standards must be re-
visited before they come into effect.
127 Note, however, that future standards will require new action before they are im-
plemented. See note 126.
128 The program has also had costs. For example, increases in fuel efficiency were
likely traded off for other things that drivers value (for example, acceleration speed and
reliability). See NRC, CAFE Report at 3 (cited in note 10). One key strategy used by
carmakers to increase fuel efficiency is the downsizing of cars, and many-but not all-
members of the National Academy of Sciences' review committee believed that CAFE
"probably resulted in an additional 1,300 to 2,600 traffic fatalities in 1993." Id. Two
members dissented from that view, concluding that there may have been no effect on fa-
talities. Id at 3 n 2. Clearly, there are possible downsides and distortive effects of sticks.
In this case, the existence of a CAFE stick could provide an additional argument for a
countervailing innovation stick addressing car fatalities. See Part III.
129 See NRC, CAFE Report at 1 (cited in note 10) ("Congress requested that the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, in consultation with the Department of Transportation, con-
duct a study to evaluate the effectiveness and impacts of CAFE standards.").
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economy for passenger cars had nearly doubled and that fuel
economy for light trucks had improved by 50 percent since the
CAFE standards were passed.13o The two main contributors to
this trend, the report concluded, were the CAFE standards and
the price of gasoline in the 1970s, with the CAFE standards
serving as a backstop for fuel economy when gasoline prices de-
creased in the 1990s.131
There is also empirical literature that speaks to how com-
panies have met the challenges of the CAFE standards. Fuel ef-
ficiency can be increased in a variety of ways, which may be
more or less innovation intensive. For example, companies may
design smaller and lighter vehicles, as they did especially within
the first decade of the CAFE standards.132 Such redesigns may
involve some innovation-for example, innovation in design or
innovation that allows a firm to do things that others have done
before it. Alternatively, it may involve simple uptake of existing
knowledge once price signals have changed. Several analysts
have suggested, however, that the CAFE program has induced
important technological change.133 Professor David Greene, in
arguing that technological improvements were the key to fuel-
economy improvements, has noted that a typical fifteen-mpg
passenger car from 1975 equipped with the technology of the
mid-1990s would get twenty-five mpg.134 Technological progress
was most rapid in the ten to fifteen years after the passage of
the CAFE standards, which lends more support to the causal
link between the CAFE standards and innovation.135 A group of
130 See id at 14. See also David L. Greene, Why CAFE Worked *2 (Oak Ridge Na-
tional Laboratory, Nov 6, 1997), archived at http://perma.cclUQ2A-DS2S (noting that the
average road vehicle in use in 1994 "emitted one-half to one-fourth as much pollution as
the average vehicle in use in 1970" depending on which pollutant is measured).
131 See NRC, CAFE Report at 14-15 (cited in note 10). See also Greene, 11 Energy J
at 37 (cited in note 113) (suggesting that CAFE standards "were perhaps twice as im-
portant an influence as gasoline prices").
132 See Hall, Note, 39 Transp L J at 9 (cited in note 113), citing David Sheridan, ed,
Increased Automobile Fuel Efficiency and Synthetic Fuels: Alternatives for Reducing Oil
Imports 105 (Office of Technology Assessment 1982).
133 See, for example, Greene, Why CAFE Worked at *8 (cited in note 130).
134 Id.
135 See Knittel, 101 Am Econ Rev at 3369 (cited in note 111). This finding is con-
sistent with empirical work on other regulatory standards in the environmental area.
See, for example, Richard G. Newell, Adam B. Jaffe, and Robert N. Stavins, The Induced
Innovation Hypothesis and Energy-Saving Technological Change, 114 Q J Econ 941,
942-43 (1999) (finding "evidence that both energy prices and government regulations
have affected the energy efficiency of the models of room air conditioners, central air
conditioners, and gas water heaters available on the market over the last four decades").
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology researchers has also con-
cluded that to meet the recent increases in required fuel effi-
ciency, the automobile industry will need to increase the de-
ployment of existing technologies and shift the focus of future
technological improvement to fuel economy (and away from, for
example, increased performance).136
The CAFE program thus provides an example of a long-
standing, consequential, and apparently partially effective inno-
vation stick. Our analysis in Part I can help us understand why
the program exists: greenhouse gas emissions represent a signif-
icant externality that is not incorporated into consumers' pur-
chasing decisions. Without another intervention that could cor-
rect the market for pollution, car manufacturers face fewer
incentives than is socially desirable to innovate to improve fuel
economy.137 Sticks may be preferred to carrots because the gov-
ernment perceives undercompensation to be a relatively small
concern. After all, carrots are available for some inventions that
would be relevant, such as new battery technologies. Other
kinds of innovations-such as innovations in car design or cor-
porate culture-may have few public-goods problems, because
they may be cheap or unlikely to be afflicted by free riding prob-
lems. Regarding information costs, it is easy to define the group
that will be penalized-the car industry-and that group is suf-
ficiently sophisticated such that it can presumably contract out
when it would be cost-effective. Our analysis also suggests, how-
ever, that the program might be still more effective if the agency
were to take its "augural" conception further and deliberately
depart from the directly foreseeable horizon of innovation, treat-
ing fines as the costs to be paid for failures to innovate at a fast-
er pace.138 After all, if we can model the social costs of pollution
136 See Parisa Bastani, John B. Heywood, and Chris Hope, U.S. CAFE Standards:
Potential for Meeting Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy Targets, 2016-2025 *12 (MIT, Jan
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/97DC-VTKQ.
137 We in no way mean to suggest that CAFE standards should be preferred to gas
or carbon taxes; we point out only that in the absence of such tax increases, regulatory
standards provide an alternative means to shape manufacturer incentives.
138 This is especially so if we consider the standards of CAFE-style programs in oth-
er countries. The European Union and Japan both have regulatory programs like the
CAFE program that are yet more ambitious in their requirements. See Global Compari-
son of Passenger Car and Light-Commercial Vehicle Fuel Economy/GHG Emissions
Standards *5 (International Council on Clean Transportation, May 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/6B4K-5ZX3. Although standards are not easy to compare across coun-
tries, current standards in Japan appear to be only slightly lower than the CAFE stand-
ards projected in the new US regulations for 2025. See id. As we noted above, fuel economy
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and if we have good data on the relative responsibility of the
transportation sector, then such fines operate as incentives to
improve and as de facto taxes that should help internalize the
harms if the standards cannot be met. While political realities
may lead the NHTSA (and Congress) to impose relatively mod-
est demands on industry and not to push the innovation enve-
lope via CAFE, a policy argument might be made for a more ag-
gressive approach that more fully causes manufacturers to
internalize the costs of their failures to innovate at the rates
shown to be feasible by their peers.
The CAFE program (and California's analogous Zero Emis-
sion Vehicle mandate, which we analyze at length in the Appen-
dix) may, on balance, be less desirable than a more systematic
tax on carbon or even on more-sector-specific tax increases such
as on gasoline. Carbon taxes and effluent taxes more generally
can themselves be seen as a kind of innovation stick, albeit of a
much more diffuse kind than those reviewed here. Given the po-
litical difficulties that such measures face in the United States,
however, it is worth understanding the potential-and, indeed,
historic-importance of regulatory innovation sticks in reducing
the damage associated with our national overreliance on fossil
fuels.
Notably, sticks have also been used in the environmental
context to address other pollutants that might not be reached
even by broad taxes on carbon or fuel. Sulfur dioxide (SO2) emis-
sions became a significant concern in the United States when
the problem of acid rain was recognized in the 1970s.139 The
problem, which came primarily from power plants burning high-
sulfur coal, was addressed with a cap-and-trade system in the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990140 ("the 1990 Amendments").
The law was designed to achieve a permanent overall reduction
is affected by many different factors, including the weight and performance of cars, so
that carmakers serving the United States might nonetheless need to innovate to meet
the same standard achieved in Japan if they attempt to keep closer to the profile of the
average US fleet rather than simply move to the much smaller profile of the Japanese
fleet. See Chyi-Ing Lin, Jer-Shiou Chiou, and Ben-Chieh Liu, Product Quality, Gasoline
Prices, and Japanese Shares in the U.S. Automobile Market, 2 Intl J Bus 61, 81 n 2
(1997) (noting that Japanese cars' gas mileage exceeded that of American cars largely
because the Japanese fleet size is smaller).
139 See James L. Regens and Robert W. Rycroft, The Acid Rain Controversy 35-58
(Pittsburgh 1988). Acid rain damages both plant life and aquatic life and has been a sig-
nificant concern in the northeastern United States. See id at 48-51.
140 Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2399, codified as amended in various sections of Ti-
tles 29 and 42.
[82:17811818
20151 Innovation Sticks 1819
in S02 emissions of about 50 percent from 1980s levels, phased
in over time.'4' Allowances for existing power plants were estab-
lished based on their historic emissions and were then scaled
down to meet the overall target cap; plants were permitted to
purchase allowances from other sources that outperformed their
respective SO2 caps.42 The EPA tracked allowances by assigning
a serial number to each allowance4 Fines for exceeding allow-
ances were steep: $2,000 per ton, increasing with inflation, and
a deduction of twice the amount of the excess from the allowance
for the next year.144 The Acid Rain Program is widely considered
a success, resulting in 100 percent compliance,145 much-reduced
emissions,146 and health and social benefits estimated in the tens
of billions of dollars.47
141 See Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the Utility Sec-
tor's Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide under the Clean Air
Act, 14 Tulane Envir L J 309, 315 (2001). The 1990 Amendments began the phaseout in
two stages. Phase I began in 1995 and affected coal-burning utility plants in twenty-one
states. Phase II began in 2000 and targeted facilities in forty-seven states. See 2012 Pro-
gress Report: S0 2 and NOx Emissions, Compliance, and Market Analyses *2 (EPA), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/6UYA-K7K8. In 2010, the 1990 Amendments capped SO2 at
half of its 1980 levels. Id at *1.
142 See 42 USC § 7651. See also Kanwalroop Kathy Dhanda, A Market-Based Solu-
tion to Acid Rain: The Case of the Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) Trading Program, 18 J Pub Pol &
Mktg 258, 259 (1999).
143 Dhanda, 18 J Pub Pol & Mktg at 260 (cited in note 142).
144 See id; 42 USC § 7651(j); 40 CFR § 77.6. The statutory penalty of $2,000 was
"significantly higher" than the cost of an allowance. John Schakenbach, Robert Vollaro,
and Reynaldo Forte, Fundamentals of Successful Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification
under a Cap-and-Trade Program, 56 J Air & Waste Mgmt Assn 1576, 1578 (2006).
145 See 1999 Compliance Report: Acid Rain Program *2 (EPA, July 2000), archived
at http://perma.cc/6SPK-URXD. The program continued to achieve 100 percent compli-
ance in 2009, the year before the statutory cap took effect. Acid Rain and Related Pro-
grams: 2009 Emission, Compliance, and Market Analyses *1 (EPA, Sept 2010), archived
at http://perma.cc/BE46-NUFK.
146 See Acid Rain and Related Programs at *2 (cited in note 145); Swift, 14 Tulane
Envir L J at 325-26 (cited in note 141); William L. Andreen, Of Fables and Federalism:
A Re-examination of the Historical Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 42
Envir L 627, 677-78 (2012) (noting that, between 1990-when the program was enacted-
and 2005, emissions of hazardous air pollutants fell by about 40 percent).
147 See, for example, Lauraine G. Chestnut, Human Health Benefits from Sulfate
Reductions under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments: Final Report *6-4
(EPA, Nov 10, 1995), archived at http://perma.cc/H5LA-H9ES (finding the annual bene-
fits of S02 reduction to be $10 billion in Phase I and projecting that they would rise to
$40 billion by 2010); Conrad G. Schneider, Death, Disease & Dirty Power: Mortality and
Health Damage Due to Air Pollution from Power Plants *5 (Clean Air Task Force, Oct
2000), archived at http://perma.cc/VV26-8ZS6 (disclosing that the total monetary bene-
fits of bringing power plants up to modern pollution standards has been calculated at
over $100 billion); Sophia Hamilton, When Scientific Palmers Make Policy: The Impact
and Future of Cap-and-Trade in the United States, 4 J Bus, Entrepreneurship & L 269,
The University of Chicago Law Review
The 1990 Amendments established a carrot-and-stick mech-
anism: heavy fines created a new emissions baseline, and the
trade provisions allowed those who could do better than the
baseline to profit from that fact. As with the CAFE standards,
firms could meet the new standard in a variety of ways. Retro-
spectively, it is clear that two main strategies were key to the
early phase of SO2 reductions: the use of scrubbers that reduced
emissions from smokestacks and the more widespread use of
lower-sulfur coal.148 Scrubber technology improved significantly
in this phase of the program after stagnating for decades-a re-
sult that has been attributed to the cap-and-trade program and
the incentives it established for more-extensive scrubber use.49
(Notably, the companies that manufacture scrubbers are not
those directly affected by the cap.150 As this illustrates, if con-
tracting is easy, there is less pressure on the government's
choice of the regulatory target.) While coal switching would
seem to require less innovation, lower-sulfur coal had properties
that made its industrial use difficult, so switching required both
experimentation with new fuel blends and modifications to
equipment-both of which were driven by the new standards."'
The stick aspect of the cap-and-trade model plays a similar
role-it helps internalize the externalities associated with pollu-
tion. The S02 program also helps illustrate the potential of a
cap-and-trade model that incorporates carrots to push the
boundaries for pioneers as well as sticks to move the laggards
along and change the structure of the market. The SO2 program
has been criticized as too permissive (that is, as having caps that
are set too high),152 reflecting the limits of government infor-
mation about the cost of reductions in SO2 and the social benefits
279 (2011) ("[T]he Acid Rain Program accounted for the largest quantified human health
benefits of any major federal regulatory program implemented in the last ten years, with
benefits exceeding costs by more than 40:1.").
148 Swift, 14 Tulane Envir L J at 328-29 (cited in note 141) (suggesting that scrub-
bers and low-sulfur coal were the main drivers for the reductions in Phase I). See also
Renee Rico, The U.S. Allowance Trading System for Sulfur Dioxide: An Update on Mar-
ket Experience, 5 Envir & Res Econ 115, 119 (1995) (covering Phases I and II).
149 See Swift, 14 Tulane Envir L J at 333-34 (cited in note 141). See also Allen S.
Bellas, Empirical Evidence of Advances in Scrubber Technology, 20 Res & Energy Econ
327, 332 (1998) (noting that the SO caps spurred innovation in scrubber technology by
offering "improved incentives" to innovate).
150 See Swift, 14 Tulane Envir L J at 330-34 (cited in note 141).
151 See id at 336-37.
152 See, for example, id at 378; Curtis Carlson, et al, Sulfur Dioxide Control by Elec-
tric Utilities: What Are the Gains from Trade?, 108 J Polit Econ 1292, 1294-95 (2000).
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associated with such reductions. Our analysis suggests that a
yardstick model, which allows firms in competition to establish the
appropriate levels of emissions reductions, might have been pref-
erable because it would have added a dynamic dimension to emis-
sions reductions that was absent in the statutorily chosen cap.153
All these examples are liability rules, but it is worth noting
that property rules can also be deployed here. The government
can act not only by imposing a fine on those who fail to innovate
but also by simply banning a particular activity outright. Exam-
ples in the environmental domain are easy to come by. The En-
ergy Independence and Security Act of 2007, by banning the
manufacture of certain incandescent lightbulbs between forty
and one hundred watts, created a stick backed by a property
rule that "spurred innovation in the lighting industry."154 An-
other successful example is provided by the United Nations
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Lay-
er'55 ("Montreal Protocol"). Finalized in 1987, the Montreal Pro-
tocol banned the production of CFCs in all signatory countries
by 2010.156 The ban has been effective at the national level,157
and it has spurred the rapid invention of CFC substitutes.1 8
153 Byron Swift has suggested that the government should have established a price
floor for the allowance auctions. See Swift, 14 Tulane Envir L J at 380 n 348 (cited in
note 141). Yardsticks might be implemented in a similar way, with reductions in allow-
ances resulting from average prices that drop below a certain level.
154 Stephen Lacey, Republicans Set to Repeal Light Bulb Efficiency Standard That
Would Save Consumers $12 Billion a Year (Climate Progress, July 8, 2011), archived at
http://perma.cc/YW3Z-CLP3.
155 26 ILM 1550 (1987) (Sept 16, 1987, entered into force Jan 1, 1989).
156 See Guus J.M. Velders, et al, Preserving Montreal Protocol Climate Benefits by
Limiting HFCs, 335 Science 922, 922 (stating that the Montreal Protocol is "responsible
for global phaseout" of CFCs); Adjustments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances That
Deplete the Ozone Layer Art 2A, 30 ILM 537, 539-40 (1991) (June 29, 1990, entered into
force Jan 1, 1992).
157 See K. Madhava Sarma, Compliance with the Montreal Protocol *308 (Seventh
International Conference on Environmental Compliance and Enforcement), archived at
http://perma.cc/34NN-LHER (noting that only thirty-five countries failed to comply with
the Montreal Protocol and that they did so by exceeding the cap by relatively low amounts).
At the international level, compliance has been "nearly perfect." Cass R. Sunstein, Of Mon-
treal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 Harv Envir L Rev 1, 38 (2007).
158 See Klaus Rennings, Redefining Innovation - Eco-innovation Research and the
Contribution from Ecological Economics, 32 Ecological Econ 319, 328 (2000). Some of
these substitutes have been successful, while others have generated their own harms
and have been the subject of further bans. Industries began producing alternatives, some
of which have generated environmental concerns of their own for example, because
they contribute to climate change. See Timo Goeschl and Grischa Perino, Innovation
without Magic Bullets: Stock Pollution and R&D Sequences, 54 J Envir Econ & Mgmt
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2. Medicare's diagnosis-related groups.
Another example of using potential penalties to incentivize
producer innovation is Medicare's hospital reimbursement
scheme for inpatient care, in which physicians classify patient
types into Medicare-established diagnosis-related groups
(DRGs).159 Under the DRG system, Medicare reimburses hospi-
tals an amount per patient determined in part by the average
cost nationally of treating patients with the same DRG assign-
ments. Specifically, the reimbursement amount is determined by
adjusting a standardized base payment for operating and capital
costs based on a DRG weight-a relative value assigned to each
DRG that represents the average resource intensity of cases
within the DRG.160 These values are derived from national data
and updated annually. The base reimbursement amount is also
adjusted according to local-level conditions, including wage in-
dex, cost of living, proportion of low-income patients served by
the hospital, and costly "outlier" cases.161
This reimbursement model produces a kind of yardstick in-
centive with both carrots and sticks.162 Hospitals are incentiv-
ized to reduce patient costs while increasing the volume of pa-
tients.163 If hospitals lower treatment costs below the
reimbursement amount, they profit. By the same token, if hospi-
tals' treatment costs are above the DRG reimbursement amount,
they face losses.64 Thus, hospitals competing against the yard-
stick of average national costs are incentivized to implement
technology and process innovations to produce more cost-effective
care.165 Hospitals may consider cost trade-offs; for instance, they
146, 156 (2007). Regulators have sought to adapt by, for example, targeting these newer
pollutants in other environmental protocols such as the Kyoto Protocol. Id.
159 See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Acute Care Hospital Inpatient
Prospective Payment System: Payment System Fact Sheet Series *2 (Department of
Health and Human Services, Apr 2013), archived at http://perma.ccN3A3-CXL8.
160 See id at *3.
161 Id.
162 See, for example, Shleifer, 16 Rand J Econ at 320 (cited in note 21).
163 See Francesc Cots, et al, DRG-Based Hospital Payment: Intended and Unintend-
ed Consequences, in Reinhard Busse, et al, eds, Diagnosis-Related Groups in Europe:
Moving towards Transparency, Efficiency and Quality in Hospitals 75, 82 (Open Univer-
sity 2011).
1s4 See Shleifer, 16 Rand J Econ at 319 (cited in note 21); Cots, et al, DRG-Based
Hospital Payment at 86 (cited in note 163).
165 See Cots, et al, DRG-Based Hospital Payment at 81-82 (cited in note 163).
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might use high-cost antibiotics to reduce the length of a patient's
stay, which can save on overall costs.1 66
Again, our theoretical analysis makes available a fairly
simple explanation for why a yardstick carrot-and-stick model
was adopted here. Because of the commitment that the govern-
ment has made to cover certain medical expenses, the difficulty
that governments have in directly observing the quality of care,
and the lack of information about and cost-internalization by pa-
tients, some cost discipline is needed. Some of the innovations
associated with patient care may generate concerns about un-
dercompensation, but patents will be available for some of these
(such as new technologies, new treatments, or better software to
manage patient data). Other innovations are likely more social
in nature-better forms of communication in the hospital, for
example. These DRG regulations allow the government to re-
main agnostic about the best methods of reducing Medicare
costs. Individual hospitals are allowed discretion to pursue the
types of interventions and innovations that will make their
treatments most cost-effective. Moreover, the hospitals compet-
ing against the average annual yardstick will understand that
the average is likely to be a moving target as hospitals produc-
ing at the average can increase their profits by reducing their
costs of care. The yardstick combination of carrots and sticks
thus not only incentivizes cost laggards to reduce their costs to
the national average but also incentivizes leaders in cost-
effectiveness to continue to improve.
The DRG example also illustrates the information problems
associated with sticks and nontraditional carrots. There is a real
concern that the DRG yardstick mechanism can also distort in-
centives on certain margins. Hospitals may develop strategies to
reduce the consumption of resources by reducing lengths of stays
without improving treatment, by increasing hospital admissions
for profitable patients, or perhaps by not implementing better
practices or technologies in favor of cost savings.167 In addition,
hospitals may "upcode" patients to diagnostic categories that
generate larger reimbursements.168 Whether these incentive
166 See id at 83-85.
167 See id at 83. See also Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) and the Medicare Pro-
gram: Implications for Medical Technology; A Technical Memorandum 25 (Office of
Technology Assessment 1983).
168 Leemore S. Dafny, How Do Hospitals Respond to Price Changes?, 95 Am Econ
Rev 1525, 1526 (2005). See also Cots, et al, DRG-Based Hospital Payment at 89 (cited in
note 163).
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distortions outweigh the yardstick benefits derived above is be-
yond the scope of this Article. But the DRG reimbursement
scheme represents another example of an innovation stick al-
ready in use, this time deployed in conjunction with carrots, via
the yardstick approach.
B. State Penalties
While the last Section focused on producer-directed incen-
tives, it is also possible to structure innovation sticks to poten-
tially penalize government entities whose actions impact the
rate of innovation. Here we discuss two federal regulations that
have subjected states to potential innovation-stick penalties.
1. Maximum-speed limit penalties.
In 1974, in response to the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries oil crisis, Congress passed the National
Maximum Speed Law as § 2 of the Emergency Highway Energy
Conservation Act,169 mandating a speed limit of fifty-five miles
per hour (mph) on all interstate roads.17° Soon after, Congress
adopted the Federal-Aid Highway Amendments of 1974,171 which
made the approval of highway projects funded by federal funds
contingent on state-enforcement certification.172 Although the
national speed limit was enacted to conserve fuel, road fatalities
fell by a startling 16 percent the very first year after the limit
was imposed, from 54,052 to 45,196.173
However, many states openly resisted complying with the
maximum speed limit. In response to this lack of compliance,
Congress passed the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1978,174 which
incentivized states to abide by the maximum speed limit by
169 Pub L No 93-239, 87 Stat 1046, 1046-47 (1974), codified at 23 USC § 154 (1974),
repealed by National Highway System Designation Act of 1995 § 205(d)(1)(B), Pub L No
104-59, 109 Stat 568, 577.
170 See Federal Highway Administration, Speed Monitoring Program Procedural
Manual for the National Maximum Speed Limit I-1 (DOT 1980) ("Speed Limit Manual")
(explaining that the fifty-five-mph speed limit was initially a temporary measure im-
posed as a result of the severe fuel shortage in late 1973); Lee S. Friedman, Donald
Hedeker, and Elihu D. Richter, Long-Term Effects of Repealing the National Maximum
Speed Limit in the United States, 99 Am J Pub Health 1626, 1626 (2009).
171 Pub L No 93-643, 88 Stat 2281 (1975), codified as amended in various sections of
Title 23.
172 FHWA, Speed Limit Manual at I-1 (cited in note 170).
173 Friedman, Hedeker, and Richter, 99 Am J Pub Health at 1626 (cited in note 170).
174 Pub L No 95-599, 92 Stat 2689.
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withholding federal highway funds for noncompliance and
awarding grants for compliance.17r Federal legislation required
states to provide data-such as the percentage of vehicles that
exceeded fifty-five mph-to the Federal Highway Administra-
tion (FHWA).178 States collected these data by utilizing monitor-
ing stations that recorded the speeds of passing vehicles during
set observation periods.177
The federal statute conditioned the amounts of sanctions
and grants on the results of the speed-monitoring audits. Like a
proposed tobacco look-back provision discussed in the Appen-
dix,178 which conditioned penalties on the results of youth-
smoking surveys, the Federal-Aid Highway Act conditioned
funds on the results of passing-vehicle-speed surveys. In 1979, if
more than 70 percent of surveyed vehicles in a state exceeded
fifty-five mph, the federal government withheld 5 percent of the
state's highway funds; if less than 60 percent of surveyed vehi-
cles exceeded fifty-five mph, the state received a boost of 10 per-
cent in federal-aid highway funds.179 The statutory level of speed
limit compliance for sanctions and grants fell by 10 percent every
year until 1983, at which point a state lost 10 percent of federal
highway funds if more than 30 percent of its surveyed motorists
exceeded the maximum speed limit and gained an additional 10
percent grant if less than 20 percent of its surveyed drivers ex-
ceeded the fifty-five-mph speed limit.180
While not based on an evolving yardstick as with Medicare
DRG compensation,181 the Federal-Aid Highway Act regime did
represent a combination of carrots and sticks that became more
stringent over time. The potential penalties represented another
example of innovation sticks that might this time be described
as attempts to make more salient for states certain social costs
that they have the power to affect but that perhaps are insuffi-
ciently salient to state officials (or local voters) to be addressed
locally.182 States that were lagging behind the compliance stand-
ard were given financial incentives to take action to come into
175 FHWA, Speed Limit Manual at I-1 (cited in note 170).
176 Id at VI-1.
177 Id at IV-3 to -5.
178 See Appendix at Part II.B.
179 FHWA, Speed Limit Manual at 1-3 (cited in note 170).
180 Id.
181 See Part II.A.2.
182 In contrast, the federal NHTSA apparatus for collecting, reporting, and analyz-
ing fatality data might make highway-safety issues more salient to federal officials.
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compliance. And as with our other examples, these incentives
were not tied to taking any particular course of action. A state
was free to choose the regulatory technology that it expected
would be best suited to avoiding the increasingly stringent pen-
alties for noncompliance. Again, this serves as a reasonable do-
main for a stick given the actors that are targeted (states) and
the multimodality of the innovations that we anticipate would
help. Undercompensation here would also appear to be a rela-
tively small risk, with traditional carrots in the background to
help prevent free riding on new technologies (such as speed
cameras) that the new regulations might help incentivize, as
well as many possible inexpensive measures-perhaps amount-
ing more to adoption than to innovation-that might be de-
ployed by states to reduce speeding rates.
This increasing stringency may, however, have eroded the
political viability of the statute.183 In 1987, Congress permitted
states to increase speed limits on rural interstate highways to
sixty-five mph.184 A study by the Insurance Institute for High-
way Safety (IIHS) found that fatalities on rural interstates in-
creased between 25 percent and 30 percent when states began
increasing speed limits on rural highways.185 Despite the relaxa-
tion in regulation, the maximum-speed limit law remained un-
popular,186 and in 1995, Congress repealed the maximum speed
limit, allowing states to set their own speed limits for the first
time in more than two decades.57 This effectively ended the era
of carrot-and-stick incentives. Although national traffic fatalities
have remained relatively stable since the repeal of the maximum-
speed limit law, many have argued that the number of fatalities
caused by increased speed has been offset by improvements in
vehicle safety.188 One study concluded that increased speed lim-
its caused 12,545 deaths between the years 1995 and 2005.189
183 Consider Speed: Speeding Makes Crashes More Likely and More Likely to Be
Deadly (Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, July 2014) ("Speed Limit Q&As"), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/5LBQ-QY9N (noting that after imposing stringent maximum
speed limits, Congress later lowered these limits).
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 See Associated Press, Lawmakers Agree on Measure to End National Speed Limit
(LA Times, Nov 16, 1995), archived at http://perma.cc/GY5R-AF4U.
187 Speed Limit Q&As (cited in note 183).
188 See National Maximum Speed Limit Repeal: Ten Years Later; Increasing Speeds
Have Limited Highway Safety Progress (Governors Highway Safety Association, Dec 6,
2005), archived at http://perma.cc/D475-9DWIU.
189 Friedman, Hedeker, and Richter, 99 Am J Pub Health at 1628 (cited in note 170).
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2. No Child Left Behind.
NCLB represents an additional example of innovation sticks
directed at government entities-in this case, public schools.190
NCLB was structured to use federal funding to states to assist
and enhance elementary and secondary school education
throughout the country. As provided, the law's aim is to close
the achievement gap by ensuring that every student is proficient
in reading and math by 2014.191 The single largest source of
funding, Title 1,192 makes funds available specifically for econom-
ically disadvantaged students.193 At the core of Title I's funding
provisions is academic accountability: states that accept federal
funds must establish uniform "challenging academic standards"
for public schools in the state and administer annual stand-
ardized exams to test whether students are meeting those
standards.'94
Title I is enforced by what amounts to failure-to-innovate
penalties directed both at failing schools and at failing school
districts.195 Specifically, the law imposes increasingly harsh sanc-
tions on schools that do not make "adequate yearly progress"
(AYP) as determined by test scores.196 If students fail to meet the
standards for two consecutive years, the school must implement a
two-year improvement plan.197 Further, the school's students may
opt to attend a different public school, or a charter school, within
the same district.19s After three consecutive years of failure to
190 See, for example, 20 USC § 6311(b)(2)(A)(iii); Office of the General Counsel, Clos-
ing the Achievement Gap: The Impact of Standards-Based Education Reform on Student
Performance *30 (US Commission on Civil Rights, July 2, 2004), archived at
http://perma.cc/RW5R-2HA4; Office of the Under Secretary, No Child Left Behind: A
Desktop Reference; 2002 *10 (Department of Education, Sept 2002) ("Desktop Refer-
ence"), archived at http://perma.cclEUX2-BHZG.
191 See 20 USC § 6311(b)(1)(C), (2)(F).
192 See 20 USC §§ 6331-39.
193 See OUS, Desktop Reference at *13 (cited in note 190). See also James E. Ryan,
The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 NYU L Rev 932, 937 (2004)
(explaining that Title I was the government's largest educational-aid program).
194 20 USC § 6311(b)(1). See also Ryan, 79 NYU L Rev at 932-33 (cited in note 193).
195 Experts have criticized this sanctions-based approach for not properly equipping
schools with the resources needed to improve. See, for example, Robert Manwaring, Re-
structuring 'Restructuring. Improving Interventions for Low-Performing Schools and
Districts *2 (Education Sector, Apr 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/SDN2-ZFZ5.
196 As with CAFE standards, AYP is less about ensuring that schools improve vis-A-
vis past performances than it is about meeting uniform yardsticks, which are applicable
to all schools. See Ryan, 79 NYU L Rev at 941 (cited in note 193).
197 20 USC § 6316(b)(1)(A).
19s 20 USC § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i).
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make AYP, the school must provide students with outside tutor-
ing services.199 A school that fails for four years in a row must
make further corrective changes, such as hiring new staff or im-
plementing a new curriculum.200 And after five years of not mak-
ing AYP, the school is placed on "restructuring" status and must
cede control to the state, which then may convert the school into
a charter school or hire a private company to manage it.20
1
As with our other examples, Congress designed the NCLB
incentives to be technology agnostic.202 Specifically, states have
broad flexibility in determining how to prepare students for
these tests.20 3 Indeed, according the US Department of Educa-
tion, a hallmark of NCLB is to provide increased flexibility and
local control. 2o4
By the 2008-2009 school year, 4,580 Title I schools out of ap-
proximately 47,000 nationwide were in the restructuring phase.
2o5
Three-quarters of these schools opted for personnel-neutral re-
forms such as implementing new grading policies or curricula.206
With respect to school districts, by the 2008-2009 school year,
1,735 districts out of roughly 15,000 required "corrective action,"
the intermediate level of sanctions.27 As with the schools faced
with restructuring, over 75 percent did not replace personnel
but rather took other corrective actions such as changing their
curricula or allowing students to transfer to other districts.20s In
some instances, NCLB sanctions have led to school closures; in
199 20 USC § 6316(b)(5)(B).
200 20 USC § 6316(b)(7)(C)(iv).
201 20 USC § 6316(b)(8).
202 See 20 USC § 6311(b)(2) (omitting technology-based subjects from the statutory
language). See also Wayne C. Riddle, Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP): Might Growth
Models Be Allowed under the No Child Left Behind Act? *5 (Congressional Research Ser-
vice, Dec 1, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/U3D4-3YA8 (noting that AYP standards
focus primarily on reading and math achievement). Many have criticized NCLB as
providing incentivizes to states to implement lower educational standards that are easi-
er to meet. See, for example, Ryan, 79 NYU L Rev at 940-42 (cited in note 193).
203 See Horne v Flores, 557 US 433, 461 (2009) ("[NCLB] reflects Congress' judgment
that the best way to raise the level of education nationwide is by granting state and local
officials flexibility to develop and implement educational programs that address local
needs, while holding them accountable for the results."). States also have discretion to
define their own proficiency standards as well as AYP benchmarks that measure "pro-
gress toward the attainment of those standards." Id.
204 See OUS, Desktop Reference at *10 (cited in note 190).
205 Manwaring, Restructuring "Restructuring' at*2 (cited in note 195).
206 See id at *3-4.




the 2007-2008 school year, approximately 3 percent of schools
that had to restructure under the law opted to close down.209
In September 2011, President Obama announced that his
administration would waive many of the components of NCLB,
including the provisions requiring 100 percent proficiency in
math and reading by 2014 and the increasingly stringent sanc-
tions for failures to make AYp.21o As of February 2015, the
administration had granted waivers to the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and forty-three of the forty-five states that had ap-
plied.211 In one sense, these waivers can be interpreted as the ef-
fective end of innovation sticks. The waivers give states so much
more flexibility in setting the agenda for academic improvement
(such as by implementing standards that focus on achievement
growth rather than absolute achievement) that they can reduce
the chance that they will fail their own chosen standards. How-
ever, another interpretation suggests that a diminished credible
threat of sanctions, especially for Title I schools, remains in
place: the lowest-performing schools must take the most-severe
remedial actions.212
Stepping back, we acknowledge that our experience with
innovation penalties in these examples (and the additional ones
discussed in our Appendix) has been at best a mixed success.
Some of the threatened sticks have not been sustained over
time. The maximum-speed limit penalties were ultimately re-
scinded after a few years. The NCLB-triggering conditions have
been substantially diluted, and current debates over the future
of NCLB suggest broad dissatisfaction with its approach.213 But
the CAFE and DRG regulations have been more sustainable
and, at least arguably, successful in inducing affirmative incen-
tives to improve welfare and push the envelope of human
knowledge.
209 Manwaring, Restructuring "Restructuring' at*3 (cited in note 195).
210 Sam Dillon, Obama Turns Some Powers of Education Back to States (NY Times,
Sept 23, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/2U7K-QNSR; No Child Left Behind - Overview
(New America Foundation, Apr 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc5ZVA-3B82.
211 ESEA Flexibility (Department of Education, Feb 25, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/5WEQ.GKLP.
212 See Wayne Riddle, Major Accountability Themes of Second-Round State Applica-
tions for NCLB Waivers *3 (Center on Education Policy, May 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/9NKC-XX47.
213 See Richard D. Kahlenberg, Saving School Choice without Undermining Poor
Communities (The Atlantic, Feb 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/MHY3-9FZ9.
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All in all, the experience with innovation penalties suggests
that the government faces nontrivial problems both in establish-
ing the appropriate innovation goals that would avoid imposi-
tion of penalties and in credibly following through and imposing
penalties on those that fail to meet the goals. The yardstick ver-
sion of innovation sticks responds to both of these concerns. A
yardstick trigger for penalties set at the median success rate is
agnostic to the pace of progress. The government need not augur
as to what will be feasible but instead need only look at what the
median was able to achieve. Moreover, a median trigger builds
in a natural, sizable constituency-the 50 percent that avoided
the penalty-to lobby for the ex post imposition of the penalty.
From this perspective, it might not be surprising that the DRG
implementation and, to some extent, the CAFE standards
(which have been careful not to move beyond what half of the
industry could accomplish) have been two of the more success-
fully sustained programs. But the purpose of this Section has
not been to argue that these specific innovation penalties are
ideally designed or that they are the best approach in each cir-
cumstance. The purpose has instead been to offer examples that
show that innovation sticks are not merely a theoretical possibil-
ity but are already in use, and are being used in domains that
our theoretical analysis can help explain.
III. A CAFE STANDARD FOR AUTOMOBILE FATALITIES
In this Part, we provide empirical support for the idea that
CAFE-like incentives could reduce the prevalence of automobile
fatalities, which annually claim the lives of more than thirty
thousand people.214 More specifically, we imagine a world in
which manufacturers are penalized if their fleets produce above-
median fatality rates and states are penalized if drivers in their
jurisdictions produce above-median fatality rates. Our aim here is
to illustrate how the concept of innovation sticks-and more par-
ticularly, a yardstick approach-might be applied to a new prob-
lem. We have chosen the problem of car fatalities both because it
is socially important and because existing regulatory efforts-
such as mandated recalls, technology-forcing safety standards,
214 US Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012 *693 (Depart-
ment of Commerce), archived at http://perma.cc/6K79-BV2A (calculating that the num-
ber of traffic fatalities in the United States in 2009 was greater than thirty thousand).
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and safety-rating disclosures-have been disappointing. As sum-
marized by Professors Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst:
Forced to choose between pursuing its technology-forcing
mission, and accommodating the demands of the hostile
legal culture surrounding it, NHTSA has adapted by evolv-
ing forms of regulation and non-regulatory "collaboration"
that have less to do with driving innovation than avoiding
conflict.215
The problem of automobile fatalities is a particularly attractive
domain for sticks because, in accord with our theoretical ac-
count, it is plausibly subject to both externalities and diverse
modes of innovation. Moreover, the high sunk costs of automo-
bile manufacturing make it relatively unlikely that undercom-
pensation will induce industry exit. Yardstick carrots (providing
rewards for below-median-fatality manufacturers) might also be
effective at spurring the desired safety improvements. But a sys-
tem of purely yardstick carrots would require the ongoing collec-
tion of tax dollars to fund the annual rewards. Our yardstick-
fatality proposal, in contrast, is revenue neutral and combines
carrot and stick incentives by transferring the stick revenues
from the above-median-fatalities laggards to the below-median-
fatalities pioneers.216 This reward would be in addition to any pa-
tent a pioneer is able to secure for a nonobvious improvement in
the safety prior art, illustrating the combined potential of carrots
and traditional sticks: sticks can correct market incentives and
encourage laggards while traditional carrots can help prevent
undercompensation.
The use of a yardstick standard not only is less susceptible
to regulatory capture but also avoids the evidentiary require-
ments that courts have demanded in advance of technology-
forcing safety standards. For example, in PACCAR, Inc v
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,17 the Ninth
Circuit, in striking down an NHTSA antilock-brake safety
215 Jerry L. Mashaw and David L. Harfst, The Transformation of Auto Safety Regu-
lation: Bureaucratic Adaptation to Legal Culture *1-2 (unpublished manuscript, Nov 25,
2015) (on file with authors). See also Jerry L. Mashaw and David L. Harfst, The Struggle
for Auto Safety 111 (Harvard 1990) (noting a shift in automobile-safety regulation "from
science and planning to crime and punishment").
216 The rewards could be made proportional to the amount by which the pioneer was
below the median.
217 573 F2d 632 (9th Cir 1978).
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standard, found that "more [probative] and convincing data evi-
dencing the reliability and safety of vehicles that are equipped
with antilock and in use must be available before the agency can
enforce a standard requiring its installation."218 Under a yard-
stick measure, the "practicable" requirement would be self-
established by the demonstrated success of competitor peers.219
We begin by identifying particular manufacturers and
states that persistently lag behind their peers, providing an em-
pirical basis for thinking that innovation-whether social or
technological-is both needed and possible in this area. As we
show in Figures 2 and 5, manufacturers like Pontiac and
Mitsubishi persistently subject their own drivers and others to an
above-median risk of death, while some states, like Mississippi
and Arkansas, persistently subject their own drivers and others
to an increased risk of death.220 While there have been continual
improvements in automobile safety over time, we identify the
savings in lives that might be achieved if the laggard states and
manufacturers were brought to the median safety rates of their
peers.221 While CAFE has used an augural process of goal setting
218 Id at 643.
219 Id at 635 & n 5. Mashaw and Harfst have independently considered whether an
even more aggressive form of yardstick competition might better incentivize safety lag-
gards to catch up. See Mashaw and Harfst, The Transformation of Auto Safety Regula-
tion at *67 (cited in note 215):
In our own reflections over the years, we have sometimes wondered why
NHTSA did not seek to advance safety innovation by proposing regulations
that would in effect require all manufacturers to match the safety performance
of the top performers - the top decile or quartile of industry. Perhaps the com-
bination of something like the [New Car Assessment Program (NCAP)] pro-
gram, incentivizing some number of manufacturers to up their safety game,
(our research thus far has not established that NCAP as presently constituted
has actually had that effect) coupled with rules codifying industry practice that
force laggard companies to "catch up", begins to resemble such a regime.
See also 42 USC § 7412(c)-(d) (requiring that existing sources of certain hazardous air
pollutants meet the emission-control level achieved by the top 12 percent of the relevant
industry group's currently operating sources). Alternatively, policymakers might choose
a less aggressive percentile trigger. For example, penalizing only the least successful
quintile of producers might increase the political feasibility of a yardstick by reducing
the proportion of industry members that are subject to the penalty. Or yardsticks could
be made less aggressive by punishing members who were unable to meet some peer per-
centile after a lag or who failed to make preestablished progress over time toward the
peer-percentile target.
220 We shared an early draft of this Article with manufacturers and states whom we
identified as persistent laggards; we profited from private communications with some
that responded.
221 Our choice to use the median US fatality rate is in many ways conservative, as
many other developed nations have shown that it is possible to generate substantially
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that has been negotiated in concert with car manufacturers, our
simulations imagine a yardstick trigger for penalties set at the
median fatality rate. The yardstick median is less susceptible to
negotiation failure ex ante and, as we argued before, provides a
more credible threat of enforcement ex post.222
Financial incentives to encourage laggards to innovate to-
ward the median currently achieved by others-even if only par-
tially effective-might save tens of billions of dollars in loss of
life. We present our estimated savings as a heuristic upper
bound, because we acknowledge that penalizing failures to inno-
vate is unlikely to eliminate all above-median fatalities. Then
again, fines for above-median fatality rates create new incentives
for manufacturers and states that are currently at or just below
the median fatality rate to innovate to stay ahead of the game.
This new competition to stay ahead of the median-and thus
qualify to share in the transfer of the above-median penalties-
might lead to an acceleration of innovation and the diffusion of
innovation throughout the industry and the states. As a matter
of theory, innovation sticks could produce benefits even larger
than the upper-bound estimates suggested here.
A. Yardstick Penalties for Above-Median Manufacturers
To begin, Figure 1 shows, using NHTSA Fatality Analysis
Reporting System data from 2000 to 2011, the median manufac-
turer fatality rates per 100,000 registered vehicles for two dif-
ferent fatality measures, which we refer to as "total" fatalities
and "external" fatalities.223 "Internal" fatalities are fatalities of
lower fatality rates. For example, the World Health Organization estimated in 2013 that
the road-traffic-death rate per 100,000 population was 67 percent lower in the United
Kingdom (and 40 percent lower in Canada) than in the United States. Global Status Re-
port on Road Safety 2013: Supporting a Decade of Action *244-51 (World Health Organi-
zation, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/9V2M-GU4L.
222 See Part I.C.
223 These measures intentionally double count certain types of fatalities in multiple-
car accidents. If a Toyota and a GMC are involved in an accident in which a person in
the Toyota dies and a pedestrian dies, the data will attribute to Toyota two total fatali-
ties and one "external pedestrian" fatality, while they will attribute to GMC two total
fatalities, one "external pedestrian" fatality, and one "external in-other-car" fatality. This
double counting is appropriate for policy purposes because it captures what Professor
Robert Cooter has called the "double responsibility at the margin." Robert Cooter, Unity
in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 Cal L Rev 1, 4 (1985). In our
example, because both the Toyota and the GMC cars were involved in the "production" of
the accident, both are appropriate targets of policies attempting to internalize the costs
of excessive fatalities.
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persons inside any car involved in an accident with at least one
fatality. External fatalities include "external pedestrian" fatali-
ties and "external-in-other-car" fatalities.









Figure 1 shows increasing safety standards over time meas-
ured in both the "total" and "external" fatality rates. The median
manufacturer total-fatality rate declined from 26 fatalities per
100,000 registered vehicles in the early years of this century to a
rate of fewer than 18 fatalities per 100,000 registered vehicles in
2011. But there is a marked dispersion in the safety of cars pro-
duced across manufacturers. Figure 2 plots the fatality rates of
the five manufacturers who averaged the highest total-fatality
rates across this time period; it shows that Chevrolet, GMC,
Pontiac, Kia, and Mitsubishi cars experienced total-fatality
rates that were persistently higher than the median fatality
rates for the industry.
224 These fatality data are from NHTSA's Fatality Analysis Reporting System. The
total number of registered vehicles is from the FHWA. National-fleet proportion data are
from the FHWA's National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) on the years from 2001 un-
til 2009. The graph shows a weighted median of 36 passenger-vehicle manufacturers'
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Of course, manufacturers compete to some extent on the
safety of their automobiles. Hence, manufacturers already have
some incentive to reduce the likelihood that their cars will kill
people-and especially people inside their cars. But studies sug-
gest that the government's crash-test system provides imperfect
information about real-world safety risks; these studies also in-
dicate that consumers are imperfectly informed about safety rat-
ings and that they imperfectly react to safety information.226
225 Figure 2 plots the five manufacturers with the highest fatality rates over time
and the median fatality rates for 2000 through 2011. Total fatality numbers are the total
numbers of fatalities in crashes involving that manufacturer.
226 See, for example, David W. Harless and George E. Hoffer, Do Laboratory Frontal
Crash Test Programs Predict Driver Fatality Risk? Evidence from within Vehicle Line
Variation in Test Ratings, 39 Accident Analysis & Prevention 902, 909-10 (2007) (sug-
gesting that crash tests have no predictive value with respect to light trucks, vans,
minivans, and SUVs, and providing that cars with one-star ratings performed twice as
well as cars with two-star ratings). See also Stephen W. Pruitt and George E. Hoffer,
Crash Test Dummies? The Impact of Televised Automotive Crash Tests on Vehicle Sales
and Securities Markets, 23 J Pub Pol & Mktg 102, 106 (2004) (finding no evidence that
NBC Dateline broadcasts of IIHS crash testing affect consumer purchases or manufac-
turer stock prices, even though IIHS ratings are significantly correlated with injury
claims reported by the Highway Loss Data Institute); George E. Hoffer, Stephen W.
Pruitt, and Robert J. Reilly, Market Responses to Publicly-Provided Information: The
Case of Automotive Safety, 24 Applied Econ 661, 664 (1992) (finding no effect on sales of
cars with excellent or poor ratings).
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But even those who are more sanguine about consumers'
abilities to make informed decisions about their own safety
should still be concerned about manufacturers who systemati-
cally lag behind in protecting people outside their customers'
cars. Manufacturers have imperfect incentives to reduce the fa-
talities of people outside their cars, as they are usually not liable
when the automobiles they produce are involved in accidents-the
same is true for the drivers themselves (and the drivers' insurance
companies).227 The manufacturers who are "total fatality" laggards
are detrimental to society from a public health perspective.
Accordingly, Figure 3 plots the fatality rates of the five
manufacturers who averaged the highest external-fatality rates
across this time period. The external-fatality rate is calculated
by looking at each car involved in an accident in which there is a
fatality and determining whether a fatality from someone not
inside the car is being considered. For example, if two Toyotas
are involved in an accident that kills the driver of one of the
cars, that accident would increase Toyota's external fatalities by
one (and Toyota's total fatalities by two). Figure 3 shows that
Ford, Dodge, Mitsubishi, Land Rover, and GMC cars experi-
enced external-fatality rates that were persistently higher than
the median external-fatality rates for the industry.
227 For the manufacturers, this is an outgrowth of the difficulty of reaching failures
to innovate through tort liability, as discussed above. Insurance companies have no in-
centives to price into their products fatality risks that the companies are not legally re-
quired to pay. Insurance covers only accidents in which fault is present, rather than all
accidents. This policy, as well as caps on liability, means that while insurance companies
do have some incentive to learn of and price in risks associated with riskier cars, these
incentives are highly incomplete.
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The persistently elevated fleet fatality rates of particular
manufacturers displayed in Figures 2 and 3 motivate us to ask
what the impact on fatalities would be if CAFE-like penalties
succeeded at inducing above-median manufacturers to take ac-
tions to reduce their fatality rates down to the median. These
penalties would be a kind of innovation stick-but of a less ag-
gressive kind, because they would not require manufacturers to
innovate toward a level of achievement currently outside the ex-
isting realm of possibility. The penalties would ask manufactur-
ers to achieve only the type of safety currently achieved by the
median registered car.
Table 2 takes up this challenge by asking how many lives
would have been saved on average annually if the intervention
succeeded at merely reducing the fatality rates of above-median
manufacturers down to the median industry rate.229 We take this
228 Figure 3 plots the five manufacturers with the highest average median external-
fatality rates from 2000 through 2011. Land Rover appears only from 2009 through 2011
because the manufacturer was not present in the NHTS's sample until 2009.
229 We deflate the numbers to adjust for the double counting mentioned above. See
note 223. This ensures that these estimates of lives lost and social costs (here and below)
are not inflated by the double counting. We create a total number of fatalities over median
by summing the fatalities over median for each manufacturer. However, because each
manufacturer's number involves double counting, we multiply this fatalities-over-median
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analysis to likely be an upper-bound estimate of the potential
savings from a CAFE-like yardstick penalty. As noted above, it
may be beyond the practicable control of some manufacturers to
lower the fatality rates, or other manufacturers may lower their
rates by shifting high-risk drivers to their heretofore below-
median competitors. It is theoretically possible, though, that
yardstick competition might produce even faster declines in the
industry median rate as below-average manufacturers take ad-
ditional precautions to assure that they stay below the penalty-
inducing median fatality rate.
TABLE 2. ABOVE-MEDIAN ANALYSIS
23 0
Yearly Cost of
Proportion of Fatalities over
Fatalities over Fatalities over Median
Median Median(%) ($ billion)
TotalFatal 1690 4.8 12.9Fatalities
ExternalFatal 920 7.1 7.0Fatalities
As shown in Table 2, moving laggard manufacturers to the
median fatality rates might save close to 1,700 lives annually, a
number that represents close to 5 percent of all car fatalities.
number by what we call the "overcount" ratio (the total number of deaths in the United
States divided by the total number of deaths in the United States, double counted). For
total fatalities, these numbers are 35,453 and 49,906, resulting in a ratio of 0.7104.
.There are circumstances, however, in which our industry-wide overcount ratio might be
systematically lower for manufacturers with higher market shares (and hence who are
more likely to be involved in accidents with two or more of their cars). To account for this
potential bias, we have in the Appendix recalculated the estimates in this Article using,
as an alternative, manufacturer-specific overcount ratios. See Appendix at Table 1A.
230 "Fatalities over Median" is calculated by multiplying the difference between each
manufacturer's fatality rate and the median fatality rate by the number of cars that the
manufacturer has on the road. For those manufacturers whose difference is positive,
these fatality numbers are then summed by year and averaged over twelve years. "Pro-
portion of Fatalities over Median" represents the fraction of fatalities that would be
saved if the fatality rate for manufacturers with a fatality rate over median were
brought down to the median. "Yearly Cost of Fatalities over Median" is calculated by
multiplying the number of "Fatalities over Median" by the EPA's estimate of the value of
a statistical life-$7.4 million, in 2006 dollars. National Center for Environmental Eco-
nomics, Frequently Asked Questions on Mortality Risk Valuation (EPA), archived at
http://perma.cc/6QQX-VQEV. Both the "Fatalities over Median" and the costs are deflat-
ed by the number of single-counted fatalities divided by the number of double-counted
fatalities of each type.
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These saved lives, valued at the EPA's estimate of the value of a
life of $7.4 million in 2006 dollars,231 would represent an avoided
cost of nearly $13 billion. Many of these lost lives come from
people who were not riding in the above-median manufacturers'
vehicle. These fatalities are literally, as well as figuratively, not
well internalized. Table 2 calculates that there would have been
920 fewer external fatalities and that improving laggard fatality
rates might have avoided 7 percent of all external fatalities,
producing $7 billion in savings.
How concretely might a CAFE-like system be applied to in-
ternalize these costs of above-median fatality risks? The Appen-
dix reports estimates of the one-time, per-vehicle penalties that
might be imposed on nineteen manufacturers if they were held
responsible for their above-median fatalities. We estimate that
Mitsubishi cars are so dangerous that the present value of costs
associated with above-median total fatalities is on the order of
$4,600 per vehicle. Six other manufacturers (Land Rover, Kia,
Pontiac, GMC, Isuzu, and Chevrolet) have estimated per-vehicle
charges of more than $1,500.22 The threat of imposing potentially
crippling fines on these manufacturers would give them strong
incentives to bring their fatality rates below (or at least substan-
tially closer to) the industry median rate.23 Those lagging manu-
facturers that failed to improve would, by raising their prices,
indirectly improve safety by shifting consumers toward the
below-median producers.
Alternatively, if one takes the view that manufacturers al-
ready have sufficient incentives to protect the drivers and pas-
sengers inside their own cars, then one might instead focus on
estimates of per-vehicle charges associated with above-median
external fatalities. Land Rover's excess external fatalities are
associated with more than $2,500 of per-vehicle costs. Four oth-
er manufacturers (in descending order: GMC, Mitsubishi, Dodge,
and Ford) are estimated to have costs associated with above-
median external fatalities of more than $1,000 per vehicle.234 It is
harder to assert that these manufacturers fully internalize the
231 Id.
232 See Appendix at Table 1A.
233 The cross-elasticities of demand are high in some cases, especially with regard to
cars in the same class. See Demand for Cars and Their Attributes: Final Report *xv-xviii
(Economics for the Environment Consultancy, Jan 2008), archived at http://perma.cc
/Y3VJ-JBKL. As a result, a manufacturer who attempted to pass along these substantial
penalties would face dramatically restricted demand.
234 See Appendix at Table 1A.
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costs associated with these elevated risks of external fatalities.
Moreover, there are certain design strategies (beginning with
reducing the weights of their cars) that are known to make
cars less "aggressive" (that is, less dangerous to people outside
the car).235
Our Appendix shows that some manufacturers have above-
median total costs but not above-median external costs (for ex-
ample, Plymouth and Oldsmobile), and vice versa (for example,
Lincoln).236 But we find particularly troubling the five manufac-
turers whose external costs exceed their total-cost estimates by
more than $100 per vehicle. In descending order, these manufac-
turers are Dodge, Jeep, Ford, GMC, and Infiniti. For example,
we estimate that for Dodge, the costs from above-median exter-
nal deaths is $1,511 while the costs from above-median total
deaths is only $423. This inversion of costs associated with total
and external fatalities occurs because Dodge cars are substan-
tially below median with regard to internal-fatality risks. The
policy concern is that Dodge may be designing or promoting its
cars in a way that makes them safer to their customers at the
expense of outsiders. We estimate that for every internal life
that Dodge saves by designing or promoting cars to bring the in-
ternal fatality rate below median, there are 2.2 above-median
external lives lost. This creates the possibility that if Dodge
modified its design to be less aggressive,237 it might be able to
produce a net reduction in total fatalities by trading off external
for internal fatalities.
The final two columns in Table 1A of the Appendix also re-
port the per-vehicle costs for above-median fatalities, but after
accounting for differences in miles driven by cars made by dif-
ferent manufacturers. A manufacturer might be above median
in fatalities per registered vehicle not because of an inferior
manufacturer design but merely because the manufacturer's
cars were driven for disproportionately more miles per year than
the median car. The final columns account for differences in
235 Jon S. Vernick, Gregory J. Tung, and Jonathan N. Kromm, Interventions to Reduce
Risks Associated with Vehicle Incompatibility, 34 Epidemiologic Rev 57, 57-58 (2012).
236 See Appendix at Table 1A.
237 The fatality literature defines "aggressivity" as a vehicle's propensity to injure or
kill someone in another vehicle. Vernick, Tung, and Kromm, 34 Epidemiologic Rev at 57
(cited in note 235). It is perverse that Dodge and other manufacturers market their cars
as having aggressive exterior designs. See, for example, Introducing the 2013 Dodge
Lineup (MOPAR News), archived at http://perma.cc9LKT-9LYW ("[Tihe Dodge Avenger
takes an aggressive stance that's impossible to ignore.').
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miles driven by manufacturer and report the reestimated im-
plied costs per vehicle that would be charged under an innovation-
stick regime.238 While there are some substantial variations in the
two methods of estimating per-vehicle costs, the larger picture is
that controlling for the differences in the miles driven does not
eliminate or even substantially change the order of the above-
median manufacturers.239
Again, we emphasize that many caveats are in order. While
the average number of miles driven by cars made by each manu-
facturer is controlled for, other unobserved characteristics of ve-
hicle drivers that are correlated with high accident rates-like
drivers being drunk or being teenage males-are not. The loca-
tions of the cars in certain states or regions will also affect acci-
dent rates. We take on many of these additional effects in the
Appendix and argue that they do not materially alter our re-
sults. The purpose of this initial empirical exercise is to show
that the project of bringing the safety of lagging manufacturers'
cars in line with the fatality rates already achievable by below-
median or median peers has the potential to produce first-order
benefits to public safety.
B. Yardstick Penalties for Above-Median States
Among the caveats to the foregoing analysis is the possibil-
ity that certain manufacturers may disproportionately sell cars
in areas that have different likelihoods of fatal accidents occur-
ring.240 If any geographic accident disparities were beyond the
238 Estimates for miles driven per year are calculated using the NHTS's data on
odometer readings and months since purchase. See Federal Highway Administration,
Introduction to the 2009 NHTS (Department of Transportation), archived at
http://perma.ccV8UF-PVN2 (noting that the 2009 NHTS data update the 2001 NHTS
data); Federal Highway Administration, 2009 National Household Travel Survey: User's
Guide *1-4 (Department of Transportation, Oct 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/3398
-4WJA (stating that the purpose of the survey was to provide a national inventory of dai-
ly travel). Dividing the odometer reading by the number of months since the vehicle was
purchased and multiplying by twelve gives a credible number of miles driven per year.
Fatality rates are adjusted by calculating a fatality rate per car-mile, determining above-
and below-median rates. By multiplying that number by the average number of miles
driven, we return to a fatality-rate-per-vehicle metric.
239 Controlling for differences in the average manufacturer miles driven impacts the
size of the implied penalties. The total-fatality penalty for Mitsubishi falls from $4,595 to
$3,895, due to the tendency of Mitsubishi drivers to drive more miles per year than the aver-
age driver (approximately 12,500 versus 11,700, respectively). The Oldsmobile total-fatality
penalty increased from $4 to $846 due to its drivers' below-average miles driven (10,200).
240 See generally Michael Sivak, Road Safety in the Individual U.S. States: Current
Status and Recent Changes (University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute,
20151 1841
1842 The University of Chicago Law Review [82:1781
control of the manufacturer, imposing yardstick penalties would
be inefficient and inequitable because the foregoing comparison
to the national median would be an inappropriate yardstick. Ta-
ble 3 shows that, even after controlling for regional differences
in accident rates, the basic lesson of the foregoing analysis
changes very little. For the manufacturer median analysis, the
seventh column, entitled "Regionally Adjusted Yearly Cost," re-
ports that the regional adjustments only modestly impact esti-
mates for "Yearly Cost of Fatalities over Median" (reported in
the sixth column below). For example, after adjusting for re-
gional differences in manufacturer sales,241 the above-median
cost of total fatalities drops from $12.9 billion to $12.6 billion,
while the above-median cost of external fatalities increases from
$7.0 billion to $7.1 billion.
July 2014), archived at http://perma.ccFM5Y-CWJ9 (providing evidence of the im-
portance of geography to automobile fatalities).
241 To control for regional variation in fatality rates and manufacturer variation in
vehicle location, we divide the country into four regions consistent with the US Census
Bureau's delineation of regions. See generally Census Regions and Divisions of the United
States (Census Bureau), archived at http://perma.cc/29E7-78SQ. Using the fatality data
and the Department of Transportation's state-by-state registration data, we determine
how much above or below the weighted-mean fatality rate each region is in each year,
deriving the weight from the region's proportion of national registrations. Then, using
the National Personal Transportation Survey data, we determine the distribution of ve-
hicles by manufacturer across the four regions. The 2001 and 2009 vehicle distributions
are averaged to compute each manufacturer's distribution for all years, which we as-
sume does not change. Using these two pieces of information, we can calculate an ad-
justed rate (fatalities per 100,000 registered vehicles) for each manufacturer using the
following formula:
(adjusted rate)iy = (unadjusted rate)iy - I (sharei, * adjustmentir)
in which i indexes manufacturer, y year, and r region; share is the proportion of that car
manufacturer in that region; and adjustment is the difference between each region's fa-
tality rate and the national weighted mean. We subtract rather than add in order to ad-
just manufacturer rates down if a manufacturer's cars are more prevalent in high-
fatality regions.
2015] Innovation Sticks 1843
TABLE 3. ABOVE-MEDIAN FATALITY ANALYSIS
Manufacturer Median Analysis
Regionally
Proportion Yearly Cost Adjusted
Std Fatalities of Fatalities of Fatalities Yearly
Dev I over over Median over Median Cost
Mean Skew Median (%) ($ billion) ($ billion
Total
Fatalities 0.27 -0.09 1690 4.8 12.9 12.6
External
Fatalities 0.31 0.08 920 7.1 7.0 7.1
Pedestrian
External
Fatalities 0.32 -0.48 88 3.9 0.7 0.7
State Median Analysis
Proportion of Yearly Cost
Std Fatalities of Fatalities
Dev / Fatalities over over Median over Median
Mean Skew Median %) ($ billion)
Total
Fatalities 0.38 1.11 8346 20.9 63.4
External
Fatalities 0.39 0.77 3541 19.2 26.9
Pedestrian
External
Fatalities 0.42 0.73 1061 15.1 8.1
But the concern about local differences in accident rates
raises the deeper question whether a CAFE standard might be
applied to states themselves instead of (or as well as) to manu-
facturers. A state-centered system of yardstick penalties would
charge states a penalty if they produced higher fatality rates
than the (registration-weighted) median rate found in other
states. The penalty would correspond to the losses associated
with just those above-median fatalities in the state.
The right-hand columns of Table 3, building on estimates
presented in the Appendix, compare the differences between an
above-median manufacturer analysis and an above-median state
analysis. While moving above-median manufacturers to the medi-
an total-fatality rate would have saved 4.8 percent more lives, Ta-
ble 3 shows that moving above-median states to the median would
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have saved a whopping 20.9 percent of vehicular fatalities.242 Simi-
larly, the table reports that while above-manufacturer-median
external fatalities represent 7.1 percent of all external fatalities,
19.2 percent of external fatalities come from above-state-median
external fatalities. The substantial proportion of above-state-
median deaths raises the possibility that from a public health
perspective, there may be greater gains in changing the behav-
ior of lagging states than in changing the behavior of lagging
manufacturers.
Figures 4 and 5 show that particular states have, over time,
been persistently above median with regard to both their total- and
external-fatality rates.243 Thus, Figure 4 shows that Mississippi's
total-fatality rate has been not just above median but massive-
ly above median. Figure 2 shows that Mitsubishi was consistently
above the manufacturer median for total fatalities, but
Mitsubishi's rate averaged only 34 percent higher. In contrast,
Mississippi's rate exceeded the median state rate by 187 percent.
242 Table 3 also suggests the reason why the proportion of above-state-median fatali-
ties is so much larger than the proportion of above-manufacturer-median fatalities. The
distribution of fatality rates across states is more variable and displays more upward
skew than the distribution of fatality rates across manufacturers. For example, the
manufacturer-level total-fatality-rate distribution exhibits a very slight downward skew
(-0.09), while the state-level total-fatality-rate distribution exhibits a substantial up-
ward skew (1.11). These distributional differences mean that the fatality rate conditional
on having an above-average fatality rate is higher for states than for manufacturers.
243 The results of these tables are consistent with the analysis in Sivak, Road Safety
in the Individual U.S. States at *i (cited in note 240):
[T]he fatality rate per distance driven varies greatly. In 2012, the lowest fatality
rates per 1 billion miles were in the District of Columbia (4.20), Massachusetts
(6.24), and Minnesota (6.93). The highest rates were in West Virginia (17.63),
South Carolina (17.60), and Montana (17.25). Similarly, the percentage change
in this rate between 2005 and 2012 exhibited a wide range. On one extreme
were the District of Columbia (-67.5%), Nevada (-48.0%), and Idaho (-39.0%).
On the other extreme were Vermont (+12.7%), North Dakota (+3.8%), and
Maine (+2.0%).
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Figure 5 displays a similar story with regard to external fa-
talities. While the median rate of external fatalities fell by 42
percent from 8.4 per 100,000 population in 2000 to 4.9 per
100,000 population in 2011, many states expose their citizens to
a hazard per registered car that is more than twice as high. The
Appendix estimates the number of above-state-median fatalities
and the associated per-vehicle penalties that would need to be
imposed on states to fully internalize the costs associated with
these above-median fatalities.44
244 See Appendix at Table 1A.
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The upward skew of the state total-fatality distribution has
a grim impact on our penalty estimates. Mississippi automobiles
average 26.77 more deaths per 100,000 registered vehicles than
the state median rate of 14.27 fatalities. If we value lives at the
$7.4 million EPA-standard valuations, these above-state-median
deaths in Mississippi represent a per-vehicle cost of more than
$15,000. (In contrast, the worst above-manufacturer-median
per-vehicle costs were only about $4,600.) If Mississippi were
forced to pay a CAFE-like penalty (for example, in terms of lost
federal funding) for these above-median fatalities, the annual
penalty would amount to a crippling annual fee of $4.1 billion,
which would equal nearly 80 percent of the state's current gen-
eral fund appropriations.245 If we instead limited our concern to
245 See State of Mississippi Budget: Fiscal Year 2014 *3 (State of Mississippi Joint
Legislative Budget Committee, June 28, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/C463-PZKA.
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the above-median external fatalities, the annual penalty would
be on the order of $1.45 billion.246
Taking into account state differences in miles driven reduc-
es the implied per-vehicle penalty of states like Mississippi from
$15,710 to $13,127 because Mississippi vehicles tend to be driv-
en more miles per year than the average vehicle in the United
States (14,200 versus 11,400 miles per year, respectively).247 But
the overall lesson is one of continuity: adjusting the innovation
sticks to take account of miles driven does not dramatically
change the identity or size of the penalties that would internal-
ize the social costs of above-median fatality rates.
Whether it is appropriate to control for differences in miles
driven turns on whether manufacturers or states should be in-
centivized to take account of how much their cars are driven. We
imagine that there are actions that either states or manufactur-
ers might take to reduce the miles driven.248 But it is not clear
that these actions are cost beneficial. For example, the states
with the highest average miles driven per registered car per
year are more rural. Forcing these states to internalize more of
the costs of driving may inequitably and inefficiently disrupt
their economies. Accordingly, we might wish to allow controls for
differences in miles driven.
In contrast, we do not think that it is appropriate to control
for all intervening variables that might impact the fatality rate.
Accidents and fatalities are attributable to driver and environ-
mental factors as well as to issues of manufacturer design. A
manufacturer who disproportionately sells to teenage drivers or
to drivers who drive while drunk is likely to have higher fatali-
ties than a manufacturer with an equally safe design who dis-
proportionately sells to safer drivers. In the Appendix, we show
that teenage-male driving and driving under the influence of
drugs or alcohol are likely causes of some of our above-median
246 The rationale for focusing on external fatalities is, however, more problematic
when analyzing the above-median state fatalities. A state's voters already, in theory, in-
ternalize the risks of both internal and external fatalities. The duly elected state officials
may already have sufficient incentives to respond to automobile fatalities occurring in
their jurisdiction.
247 The difference between the miles driven for the average vehicle (11,400) and the
number mentioned in note 239 (11,700) is due to the error introduced in the sampling
methodology of the NHTS. The discrepancy is around 3 percent. 2009 National House-
hold Travel Survey at *7-1 to -2 (cited in note 238).
248 For example, either manufacturers or states might offer drivers a rebate if they
agree to higher gasoline taxes. See generally Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff, Why Not? A
Voluntary Gas Tax (Forbes, Mar 16, 2009), archived at http://perma.ccLB8X-PXDQ.
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results.29 Nonetheless, we believe that it is likely appropriate to
hold manufacturers and states financially responsible for these
above-median deaths because both manufacturers and states
can plausibly take cost-effective actions to reduce the fatality
risks of these disproportionately dangerous driver types. For ex-
ample, manufacturers might affect teenage accident rates by fa-
cilitating the use of GPS monitoring to keep insurance compa-
nies and parents aware of reckless teenagers' driving patterns.
250
Manufacturers could affect drunk driving accident rates by fol-
lowing Ford's lead and including automated audible warnings
that go off inside the cars when drivers are caught drifting out of
their lanes.251 Existing driver-assist technologies available from
Mercedes and a number of other manufacturers use a forward-
looking radar to detect imminent collision and automatically
brake the car (utilizing the full distance to the object to reduce
the likelihood of being hit from behind) while simultaneously
flashing brake lights, tightening seat belts, adjusting head rests,
closing the windows and the roof, and raising the roll bar.252
State action can also directly affect both teenage-male and
drunk driving accident rates. Graduated driver's license re-
quirements for teens could be made more stringent in many
states.253 The requirement that teens not drive after 8:00 p.m.,
for example, has been found to lower teenage-fatality rates by 20
percent.254 A wide variety of policy interventions are available to
states that wish to lower drunk driving accident rates-
including enforcement of seat belt laws, lower speed limits,
sobriety checkpoints, and speed cameras.255 Roadway improve-
ments-such as rumble strips both on the edges and in the mid-
dle of roads, roadway lighting, and guardrail improvements-
249 See Appendix at Part III.A.1.
250 See Kathleen Doheny, Car Tracking Devices for Teen Drivers: Monitoring Can
Help, but It Doesn't Replace Communication (Edmunds.com, May 23, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/U35A-3QSG.
251 See Paul Stenquist, New Ford Fusion Will Warn Drivers Who Drift (NY Times,
Dec 29, 2011), archived at http://perma.ccY4NC-VXEW.
252 See, for example, A. Goodwin, et al, Countermeasures That Work: A Highway
Safety Countermeasures Guide for State Highway Safety Offices *5-22, 6-14 (NHTSA,
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/882K-LREH.
253 The Governors Highway Safety Association keeps a list of state-by-state teenage-
driver requirements. Graduated Diver Licensing (GDL) Laws (Governors Highway Safe-
ty Association, Feb 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/N7KX-VAAH.
254 See Anne T. McCartt, et al, Graduated Licensing Laws and Fatal Crashes of
Teenage Drivers: A National Study, 11 Traffic Injury Prevention 240, 246 (2010).
255 See, for example, Goodwin, et al, Countermeasures That Work at *1-19, 3-12,
6-14, 8-24 (cited in note 252).
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are another possibility. States could also lower the legal blood
alcohol concentration (BAC) threshold below 0.08 (as studies
have shown that impairment occurs at a BAC as low as 0.01)256
and require the use of ignition "interlock" Breathalyzer systems
for driving-under-the-influence (DUI) offenders.257 DUI enforce-
ment could become more high profile, or states could take away
drivers' licenses or cars if drivers were caught driving drunk.258
Given the wide range of plausibly cost-effective interventions
that could be undertaken by both manufacturers and states, it is
inappropriate to control for differences in DUI when calculating
the size of innovation-laggard penalties.
The plausible ability to effectively react to incentives is a
necessary but not sufficient basis for imposing even partial penal-
ties. We have not developed a theoretical account here explaining
why we should reduce car fatalities. Rather, we have loosely as-
sumed a welfarist approach in the style and manner of our rea-
soning, but we have not done more than that in part because we
believe that reductions in such fatalities are likely to be desirable
from many different normative perspectives. However, different
value perspectives may also generate arguments that should be
addressed before adopting such penalties. From a welfarist per-
spective, for example, there are unaccounted-for benefits of fast,
reckless, and even inebriated driving.259 A liberal or rights-based
perspective might generate additional objections, such as con-
cerns that pressures on manufacturers would lead to technologies
with an unacceptable impact on privacy or autonomy or that
256 See Safety Report: Reaching Zero; Actions to Eliminate Alcohol-Impaired Driv-
ing *22-24 (National Transportation Safety Board, May 14, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/7N72-X8RH (providing that driving-related performance is degraded at
BAC levels as low as 0.01 and recommending a reduction of the BAC limit).
257 See id at *28 ("In 2011, more than 1.2 million arrests were made for [DUIs] ...
yet, as of 2012, fewer than 280,000 interlocks were in use in the United States.").
258 Professor Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo has found that the punishments for DUIs
did not affect the probability of recidivism, but that license suspensions (during the sus-
pension period) and interlock devices did. Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Throw Away the Jail
or Throw Away the Key? The Effect of Punishment on Recidivism and Social Cost *42-59
(unpublished manuscript, June 21, 2014), archived at http://perma.ccIEQ6R-Q7CB.
259 See, for example, Carolina Pinto Pereira Barbosa, Economic Evaluation of Alco-
hol Treatments: Linking Drinking Patterns, Alcohol Consequences and Cost Effectiveness
of Alcohol Treatments *58-59 (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of York, Feb
2010), archived at http://perma.cc/WNR4-5SHT (explaining that welfarists believe that
individuals are the best judges of their own welfare and that the social consequences of
alcohol abuse should be estimated only as net social consequences, as drinkers' private
consequences and associated costs and benefits are irrelevant to the interests of others).
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pressures on states would lead to problematic surveillance.260
From a welfarist, liberal, or rights-based approach-among oth-
ers--one might also question whether it is appropriate for the
federal government to shift the incentives of states in the ways
we suggest here. The politicians of Mississippi and other laggard
states already have some incentives (or, put in a more deontic
frame, some responsibility) to protect the citizens of their states
both inside and outside of automobiles. Before imposing penal-
ties on states, we should have a better account of why local poli-
tics do not adequately address the problem.
A few further caveats are in order. Before imposing such a
system on the states, we might also want a closer study of the
reasons for the disparities.261 For example, poverty may be a
deeper driver of the higher fatality risk in laggard states. In the
public health literature, poverty puts people at systematically
higher risks for a variety of bad outcomes-including alcoholism
and accidents.262 States with more-impoverished drivers may
have fewer cost-effective actions to mitigate their above-median
fatality rates. Before imposing such a system on manufacturers,
we might want to consider the extent to which manufacturer
penalties may merely cause a reshuffling of high-risk drivers
without improving overall safety.
At a minimum, our empirics are sufficient proof to warrant
further consideration. We have shown that particular manufac-
turers and particular states persistently lag behind the median
levels of safety achieved by their peers and that penalties that
would move these laggards to the median might save thousands
of lives per year. Finally, our example helps to illustrate the
260 See Roger C. Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions: A Study of Deter-
rence, 67 Mich L Rev 421, 421-22 (1969).
261 Two possible reasons that have occurred to us, but that are not explored in this
analysis, include differences in the number of (or distance to) high-level trauma units in
different states and differences in the average age of the fleet. Closer analysis of these
drivers might be illuminating. Controlling for these differences would be appropriate only if
we assumed that these factors cannot or should not be influenced by the stick (or carrot).
See text accompanying note 258.
262 See generally, for example, Elisa R. Braver, Race, Hispanic Origin, and Socioec-
onomic Status in Relation to Motor Vehicle Occupant Death Rates and Risk Factors
among Adults, 35 Accident Analysis & Prevention 295 (2003) (finding that fatal-accident
victims from lower socioeconomic strata were more likely to have higher BACs than
those of higher socioeconomic status). If poverty were a main factor, then sticks that fur-
ther impoverished laggard states might just exacerbate the issue. In the language we
develop in the text accompanying this note, we would have more of an undercompensa-




potential power of a sticks-based approach to innovation as well
as some of the complexities associated with the design of innova-
tion sticks. While these complexities should be taken seriously,
feedback effects can help refine such sticks over time. Our em-
pirics also help to vividly show the high costs of inaction in an
area in which innovation can plausibly have very beneficial ef-
fects but is not well incentivized by traditional carrots.
CONCLUSION
There may be no more hoary expression than the one we be-
gan with: necessity is the mother of invention. It is striking,
therefore, how absent this trope is from scholarly thinking about
innovation. No one says that "reward is the parent of invention,"
but innovation policy is almost exclusively about what kind of
legal carrot would best promote invention.
Recognizing this absence leads us to ask whether stick in-
centives or carrot-and-stick regimes might ever be normatively
attractive. It also allows us to ask whether such regimes have
ever existed. We have provided examples here of innovation
sticks in use and have also provided an argument as to why, in
certain circumstances, they are appropriate. Further, we have
offered strategies, such as the use of yardsticks, that can in-
crease the plausibility of innovation sticks. We have even pro-
vided heuristic empirics on why and how yardstick penalties
might be applied to laggard states and automobile manufacturers
in order to encourage each to innovate to reduce car fatalities. En-
lightened policymaking will never embrace Rumpelstiltskin
threats-"Figure out how to spin straw into gold or we'll have
your head offi"263 But this Article has shown that policymakers
at times should use-and in fact have already used-smart sys-
tems of potential penalties to shape innovation incentives.
To see the value of innovation sticks, we must recognize
three points that have not yet been fully appreciated in the IP
literature. First, innovation comes in many modes, only some of
which are well compensated by conventional IPRs and only some
of which generate goods that are "public goods" in the classic
sense of the term. Second, it may be difficult, as a policymaker,
to tell whether innovation or merely adoption of an innovation is
needed. Mechanisms that are agnostic as to the mode of innova-
tion, or even as to whether results are reached with innovation
263 See Grimm's Complete Fairytales 235-38 (Barnes & Noble 1993).
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or rote adoption, can therefore also be valuable. These first two
points advance our appreciation not only of sticks but also of
nontraditional carrots. A third point is critical to understanding
the possible value of sticks: when setting innovation policy,
overcompensation-not just undercompensation-is a possible
risk. When innovation is possible without major free rider prob-
lems, sticks have advantages over nontraditional carrots and
may make substantial efficiency gains possible.
While most academics in this field think of themselves as
intellectual property scholars, our insights here pose a new
question: Should there also be a category of "intellectual anti-
property"?24 If IP is a conditional asset that one acquires by be-
ing creative, intellectual antiproperty would be a conditional li-
ability that one could avoid only by being creative.265 And
antiproperty will sometimes be a more efficient means to induce
innovation than property itself.
264 For a different usage of the term "antiproperty," see Abraham Bell and Gideon
Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 Mich L Rev 1, 5 (2003) ("Antiproperty
rights are veto rights over the use of an asset that are granted to a large number of pri-
vate actors.").
265 Put in option terms, intellectual property regimes grant potential innovators call
options, while intellectual antiproperty regimes would grant potential innovators some-
thing more analogous to a put option. See Ian Ayres, Optional Law: The Structure of Le-
gal Entitlements 45 (Chicago 2005) (discussing the characteristics of option value gener-
ally). Or, alternatively, we might consider this contingent liability as a form of
"intellectual tort law." See Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright as Tort Law's Mirror Image:
"Harms," 'Benefits," and the Uses and Limits of Analogy, 34 McGeorge L Rev 533, 535
(2003) ("In copyright law, 'carrots' are given to plaintiffs to make them produce more
creative works. In tort law, 'sticks' are imposed on defendants to make them engage less
in destructive behavior. In this way, torts and copyright mirror each other, operating in
ways that are parallel but reversed.").
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